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ARTICLES

"DANCING IN THE COURTHOUSE": THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS OPENS A NEW ROUND
Eugene Cerruti*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after World War II, concern mounted over the
government's ability and tendency to institutionalize secrecy in
government. The initial concern was with the anti-communist
sleuthing of various legislative bodies which dramatized the
power of secretly held information to control the public agenda
of both domestic and foreign policy debate. From this emerged
the call for a more "open" government and the political claim
that the electorate had a "right to know"' the information acquired and relied upon by government officials. For the press in
particular, "access" increasingly became the watchword, the
icon, of the new era.2 The mounting pressure for greater open* Professor and Director of Trial Advocacy, New York Law School. B.A., 1966,
Harvard University; J.D., 1970, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Research on
this article began while the author served as Reporter to the ABA Task Force to
Update the Fair Trial-Free Press Standards, chaired by Hon. Alexander H. Williams
III. On the issue of access, the Williams Report was adopted by the ABA, with modifications, as Standard 8-3.2. The present article is not an ABA statement, but the
author does wish to acknowledge the creative and collaborative insights of Judge
Williams and the other individual members of the Task Force: David E. Kendall,
Elmer R. Oettinger, Richard Schmidt, Jr., and Barbara D. Underwood. The author
also wishes to thank Elizabeth Rose for her excellent research assistance.
1. The popular origin of this term is commonly attributed to a speech given in
1945 by Kent Cooper, then Executive Director of the Associated Press. The seminal
text was H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT-TO-KNOW (1953).
2. A recent nationwide survey found "striking evidence" that broad-based access
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ness led over time to the spate of "sunshine" and freedom of
information laws passed in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Following this limited legislative success, advocates of a more
open government sought to extend their gains through the
courts. The press brought a series of lawsuits during the 1970s
seeking to gain access to government-controlled information not
covered by the various statutes. The legal claim of these suits
was essentially that such a right of press access, although not
specifically enumerated anywhere in the Constitution, was
nonetheless implied in either the express language or the very
"structural" design of the First Amendment. The apparently
settled view of the cases, however, was that although the traditional libertarian philosophy of the First Amendment staunchly
shielded private expression from government regulation, it did
not at all affirmatively require government to provide information to the private market of expression.
This claim of First Amendment-based access to government
information had been so consistently and emphatically rejected
by the Supreme Court that by the late 1970s, it was considered
an all but dead letter. Then, in one of the more remarkable and
unanticipated turnabouts on the Court, an unconsolidated majority adopted a variation of the so-called structural theory to
recognize for the first time a First Amendment-based affirmative right of public access to criminal trial proceedings. And
with surprisingly little fanfare, the foundation of the First
AmendnIent was realigned to support the diverse and increasing claims of access to an open government in a post-libertarian
era.
The seminal case was Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia.' It held that the public had a First Amendment right to
attend criminal trials. Although novel, the actual holding was
hardly controversial. The record of the case presented a rather
extraordinary, and somewhat suspect, order by the trial court
excluding all members of the press and public from the third
retrial of a convicted murderer. Yet, while the facts of the case

issues had well surpassed both prior restraints and libel as the principal litigation
concern of the press. Media Litigation '88, Society of Professional Journalists (on file
with the University of Richmond Law Review).
3. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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were compelling, there was no ready legal basis for reversal.
Indeed, the Court had only recently examined and rejected a
series of constitutional challenges to governmental door
closings,4 leaving itself little room to find a First Amendment
violation in the trial court's closure order. But the Supreme
Court did manage to reverse, and it did so by recognizing a
new dimension to the underlying political, or structural, mandate of the First Amendment.
Justice Stevens referred to Richmond Newspapers as a "watershed case."5 And indeed it is. It is a First Amendment case
that extends the doctrine beyond speech. It significantly revises
the "central meaning" of the First Amendment by adopting an
essentially republican interpretation of the affirmative principles of self-government. For the central premise of Richmond
Newspapers is that meaningful self-government requires an
informed electorate, and that where the representative government itself maintains control of information essential to such
an informed public discourse, the government may be affirmatively required to provide that information to the public.
The initial commentaries on Richmond Newspapers all heralded major changes in First Amendment jurisprudence.6 And,
to be sure, there has certainly been an expansive groundswell
of case law in the lower courts. Yet there has been a remarkable absence of critical attention paid to the extraordinary character and significance of the Richmond Newspapers doctrine.
There are many possible explanations for this curiously low
profile, yet there is little point in maintaining it. This article
attempts to give the doctrine its due. This requires in the first
instance that the doctrine be firmly recognized and confirmed
as the watershed legal development that it is. It is then necessary to look behind the doctrine to expose the critical theoretical innovations that enabled the Court to create an affirmative

4. See infra part I.
5. 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
6. Lillian R. BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311 (1982) ("Richmond Newspapers may well
signal the arrival of an expansive new First Amendment doctrine."); Archibald Cox,
Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1980)
("The full significance of Richmond Newspapers waits for the future."); Note, The
Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 149 (1980) ("[T]he decision should
lead to a significant and salutary recasting of much First Amendment doctrine.").
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right of access to government information that reaches beyond
the traditional libertarian philosophy of the First Amendment.
Finally, the doctrine requires a critical restatement to correct
and extend its application in a number of areas.
This article, therefore, proceeds in three parts. Part II demonstrates that Richmond Newspapers was no marginal passage
in First Amendment case law. Rather, it was a genuine
transformative moment in the law when the Supreme Court
acted boldly to escape the terminal logic of its own proud libertarian tradition of safeguarding First Amendment freedoms.
The Court found that a strictly libertarian philosophy of freedom did not carry the Constitution far enough. The argument
of this part does not attempt to represent Richmond Newspapers as a strictly logical unfolding of traditional pluralist First
Amendment principles. Quite the contrary, the assumption here
is that a true appreciation of what actually took place in Richmond Newspapers cannot be gained in traditional doctrinal
terms. It must be grasped within the narrative context of the
Supreme Court's ongoing inability to justify and maintain the
traditional doctrine against the mounting pressure of a compelling public demand for greater access to government operations.
It was the very exhaustion of the traditional libertarian paradigm of freedom, and its inability to secure a proactive self-government against the informational hegemony of the modern
state, that forced the Court to reach beyond, but not to break,
that mold. Therefore the argument of this section is essentially
narrative in format. It attempts to tell the legal story of a fitful
new right stumbling into its point of departure.
Part III describes the Court's revised theory of the structural
role of the First Amendment which was abruptly constructed to
support the new right announced in Richmond Newspapers. For
a variety of reasons, the Supreme Court opinions do not adequately articulate, or even acknowledge, the novelty of the
underlying theory. This Part identifies Justice Brennan, who
wrote only a concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, as
the true proponent of the new extension of First Amendment
theory. But even with respect to the well-advanced First
Amendment jurisprudence of Justice Brennan, Richmond Newspapers was a stretch. A close reading of Justice Brennan's
"structural" theory in Richmond Newspapers reveals that he
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once again returned for new inspiration to the progressive writings of Alexander Meiklejohn. Part III then demonstrates,
through a more thorough unpacking of Meiklejohn's unconventional First Amendment theories, the genuinely transformative
shift in Richmond Newspapers from a strictly libertarian to a
moderately republican interpretation of the First Amendment.
Part IV proposes a significant revision to our reading of the
new right of access in order to better fulfill the policy mission
of the underlying structural theory. The right of access, as
presently construed, attaches individually and independently to
particularized items of government information pursuant to a
two-prong test for inclusion. This test does not reflect the actual theory of access and barely explains the actual holdings in
the individual cases. The right should be restated as a systemic
right of access to all deliberative information within the Judiciary. This restatement will not only better reduce the existing
case law to a coherent doctrine, but it will also permit the right
to extend itself in principled fashion to the new, and perhaps
more urgent, issues of access.
II. THE NEW RIGHT OF ACCESS
As of 1980, there was no recognized constitutional right of
public access to information held or controlled by the government. Access to such information in the Legislative and Executive Branches was governed entirely by statute. Access to information within the Judicial Branch was limited to the common
law rules providing access to various court records and exhibits.
A then-recent series of attempts to gain constitutional recognition of a citizen's putative right-to-know information held by his
or her elected representatives in the two political branches had
been soundly thwarted by the Supreme Court. The Court had
consistently held that the First Amendment protected only the
liberty to be free from government restraint, not the affirmative
right to acquire government information. As recently as 1979,
the Supreme Court had gone so far as to refuse to grant constitutional status to the right of the public to attend a pretrial
suppression hearing in a criminal case. Then, in 1980 with
Richmond Newspapers, the Court abruptly and ironically adopted a revised formulation of the right-to-know theory to identify
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a First Amendment right of access to information located within
the traditionally non-representative Judicial Branch.
A. The New Factual Paradigm:Secrecy in the Courthouse
On December 2, 1975, a local motel manager in the small
community of Hanover County, Virginia was stabbed to death.
In March 1976, John Paul Stevenson and two others were indicted for the murder. The following July, the three men were
tried; Stevenson and one other were convicted of second degree
murder. Stevenson was sentenced to serve ten years in prison.
The homicide was an "ordinary case ' 7 that was only routinely
reported in the local press.
Over a year later, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed
Stevenson's conviction because a bloodstained shirt that connected him to the crime had been improperly admitted as evidence.' His retrial began in May 1978, but it ended in a mistrial because one juror had to be excused and there were no
alternate jurors available.9 Stevenson was retried again the
following June, and again the judge declared a mistrial, this
time because one of the jurors had read reports of the earlier
mistrial and had shared that information with fellow jurors."
Stevenson faced trial for a fourth time the following September. At the outset of the scheduled two-day trial, two local
reporters were present in the courtroom. As a result,
Stevenson's attorney made a motion he had not made in any of
the three previous trials. He moved to close the courtroom to
all but the trial participants because he did not "want any
information being shuffled back and forth when we have a
recess as to what-who testified to what."" The prosecutor
did not object to the motion, and the judge issued an order
from the bench closing the courtroom. The two ejected reporters
returned to the court with counsel that afternoon to oppose the
closure order. The trial court held a brief hearing at the close
7.
(1980)
8.
9.
10.
11.

Brief for Appellants at 5, Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(No. 79-243).
Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 779 (Va. 1977).
448 U.S. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 559-60.
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of the day and denied the motion to vacate the order. The judge
apparently relied upon a state statute that permitted such closure at the judge's discretion. 2
What happened in court the following day remains remarkably unclear. The only record of the proceedings is a one-page
order of the trial court indicating that a defense motion for
another mistrial was "taken under advisement," a defense motion to "strike the Commonwealth's evidence" was granted, the
jury was dismissed, and the trial judge "doth find the accused
NOT GUILTY of Murder." 3
Counsel for Richmond Newspapers thereafter petitioned directly to the Virginia Supreme Court to review the trial court's
closure order, but the Virginia Supreme Court, finding no reversible error, denied the petition.'4 The case then proceeded
directly to the United States Supreme Court on a record that
contained neither a written opinion by any lower court, nor
even a clear account of what had transpired at the trial court.
The record thus submitted for direct review by the Supreme
Court appeared in many respects to present an easy case. The
trial attorneys for both sides and the trial court appeared to
have cooperated, for no known or compelling reason, in the
removal from the courtroom of all members of the public, including the jury, whereupon a man previously convicted by a
jury of murder was secretly found not guilty by the judge alone
in a manner that apparently precluded any further review or
retrial on the merits. The appellant newspaper certainly had
"good facts," there was an obviously vulnerable statute at the
center of the case, and the Virginia Supreme Court had refused
to review either the statute or the closure order. Moreover,
there was the prominent finding by the Supreme Court in an

12. The statute reads:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any
persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided
that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1980). The Supreme Court had noted
the existence of this statute, with apparent approval, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 388 n.19 (1979).
13. 448 U.S. at 561-62.
14. Id. at 562.
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earlier case that it had been "unable to find a single instance of
a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or
municipal court during the history of this country." 5 A more
compelling case for unlocking the doors of justice was unlikely.
But the case was only apparently an easy mark for reversal.
For, in fact, it presented the Supreme Court with a direct challenge to its very recent refusal to recognize a constitutional
right for a member of the press to gain access to a criminal
proceeding or other government facilities. However compelling
the claim of a constitutional right of access to Stevenson's trial,
the law was definitely to the contrary.
B. The Paradigm of Precedent: Shields vs. Swords
The Supreme Court in several recent lines of cases had left
itself little room to recognize a constitutional right of access to
Stevenson's trial. Press plaintiffs had attempted to gain recognition for such a right under both the Free Press Clause of the
First Amendment and the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. The claims raised under the Free Press Clause
challenged the restraining effect of a closure order on the informed reporting of a traditionally public proceeding that resolved issues of utmost public, if not political, concern. As argued by the plaintiffs in Richmond Newspapers: "The next
morning's newspapers could report only that the defendant had
been set free." 6 The parallel challenge raised under the Public
Trial Clause was that a trial institution historically designed
and constitutionally safeguarded for public participation in a
variety of forms was reverting to a "Star Chamber." In the oftcited words of the Supreme Court: "A trial is a public
event.
7
What transpires in the courtroom is public property."

But the Court had found both the First and Sixth Amendment claims to an affirmative right of access to government
sources of information quite unavailing. There was of course
notable legal protection to be found for the free flow of information between private citizens, but the paradigm of protection of

15. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 n.4 (1948).
16. Brief for Appellants at 9, Richmond Newspapers (No. 79-243).
17. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
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speech and publication was that of the shield. The government
was generally prevented from engaging in conduct which affirmatively burdened the private traffic in information, but it was
nowhere constitutionally required to provide information as
such for the private knowledge of citizens. As Justice Stevens
noted with respect to the Court's earlier case law, "the Court
has accorded virtually absolute protection to the dissemination
of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely held
that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any
constitutional protection whatsoever." 8
The case law was actually rather misleading in this area. A
good deal of language in dicta and dissent implied greater legal
recognition of a citizen's right to know government information
than was in fact the case. Within First Amendment doctrine,
three distinct putative rights suggested the inference that the
Supreme Court had tacitly acknowledged a public "right to
know:" (1) a right-to-receive information over government objection; (2) a right-to-gather information for purposes of publication; and (3) a right-of-access to government facilities. Indeed,
by the mid-1970s, one of our most noted First Amendment
scholars claimed that "[tihe Supreme Court has recognized in a
number of cases that the [Flirst [Almendment embodies a constitutional guarantee of the right-to-know." 9 Upon close examination, however, none of these putative rights truly provided
the press or public with any entitlement to wrest from a reluctant sovereign any information the sovereign did not choose to
provide."
The right-to-receive cases essentially established that otherwise permissible speech could not be effectively restrained by
denying the speaker an audience. Several early cases had held
that it was unconstitutional to impose a license tax on advertising;2 ' to prohibit door-to-door distribution of literature;2 2 or to
18. 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
19. Thomas I. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First
Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 755 (1977).
20. At the close of the decade, another scholar of note reviewed the relevant case
law and concluded that "the combined force of the privilege and access cases would
seem thoroughly to undercut any argument that significant precedential support can
still be mustered for a right to information within the government's control." Lillian
R. BeVier, An Informed Public, An Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional
Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 497 (1980).
21. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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detain communist propaganda in the mails. 2 All these methods restrained access to the information by the intended receiver. Thus, by 1969 the Supreme Court could announce that "[i]t
is now well established that the Constitution protects the rightto-receive information and ideas."'
But this right was never more than the right of a willing
recipient to obtain information from a "willing speaker."25 It
never recognized an affirmative right to obtain information on
demand from an unwilling private or public source. Indeed,
otherwise willing public employees as such do not even have a
First Amendment right to publish government information
within their possession.2 6 And there certainly can be no derivative right to receive where there is no underlying right to publish. Therefore, although the press petitioners in Richmond
Newspapers did cite the right-to-receive cases in their brief, the
doctrine provided scant authority for a right of access to a judicial proceeding intentionally closed by the trial judge pursuant
to a state statute.
The right to gather cases were equally unavailing to establish
an affirmative right of access to a criminal trial. Here the dicta
in the case law were particularly misleading. Despite a series of
assertions by the Supreme Court clearly suggesting tacit recognition of an independent First Amendment right to gather information for purposes of publication,2 7 the Court had never
resolved a case on that basis. Indeed, whenever the issue was
squarely presented before the Court, the proponents of the
putative right-to-gather were emphatically denied.2 8
22. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
23. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
24. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
25. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
26. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973).
27. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). "Nor is it suggested that news
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681. "The
press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make
money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the
public's right-to-know." Id. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "A corollary of the right to
publish must be the right-to-gather news." Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. E.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
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The critical claim of the right-to-gather protagonists was that
the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment conferred upon
the Fourth Estate29 a constitutional role or status that was
separate from, and in some respects superior to, the more universal freedoms of speech and publication. This constitutional
postulate of a "press privilege" flourished for a brief period
beginning in the late 1960s, but only in the academic literature0 and case dicta.3 ' It never actually took root in the case
law. 2 Indeed, the first occasion of its rejection occurred somewhat prematurely during the late Warren Court era in a case
that did not even involve a press party.
In Zemel v. Rusk,"3 the petitioner sought to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba shortly after the Department
of State had imposed restrictions on such travel. He claimed
that the purpose for his travel was "to satisfy [his] curiosity
about the state of affairs in Cuba and to make [himselfl a better informed citizen."' The State Department denied his application. The petitioner raised a First Amendment claim, asserting a right to travel for purposes of exercising his right to informed speech. The Supreme Court's almost peremptory rejection of this argument demonstrated its fundamental opposition
to the various attempts to extend the right-to-know principle of
the First Amendment. The Court stated: "There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argu-

U.S. 547 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
29. Justice Stewart emphasized the Fourth Estate metaphor to describe the structural significance of the Free Press Clause in a much-heralded speech he gave advocating recognition of an independent press privilege. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
30. Floyd Abrams, The Press is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the
Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1979); Randall P. Bezanson, The New
Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV.731 (1977); David Lange, The Speech and Press
Clause, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a
Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975);
Stewart, supra note 29. For a revived and revised presentation of this argument, see
Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the FirstAmendment, 44 STAN. L.
REv. 927 (1992).

31. See infra text accompanying note 37.
32. The short-lived development of a "press privilege" in case law occurred in the
Ninth Circuit opinion in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970),
rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
33. 381 U.S. 1 (1964).
34. Id. at 4.
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ment in the garb of a decreased data flow....

The right to

speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right
to gather information."35 Therefore, before the press ever presented its independent claim to constitutional protection of the
news gathering process, the Supreme Court had already articulated the premise that the precommunicative processes of gathering information fell outside the protective shadow of the First
Amendment shield.
The direct claim that the information-gathering functions of
the established press were independently privileged was presented and rejected in three major cases decided by the Supreme Court during the 1970s." 6 In each case, the press argued that the increasing encroachment of the legal process on
the autonomy of the press required a commensurate expansion
of First Amendment protection. Beginning in the late 1960s, the
press argued, with some small success, 7 that the essential
prepublication process of newsgathering required preventative
protection against the "increasing disposition of various governmental agencies to use news reporters as fact-finding instruments."38 In each instance, however, the Supreme Court refused to extend such protection to an otherwise lawful process
that did not directly restrain or punish the very act of publication.
The seminal case was Branzburg v. Hayes. 9 Branzburg was
one of an increasing number of investigative journalists who
were issued grand jury subpoenas compelling them to testify
and reveal the confidential sources for their news articles.4" He
argued that forcing him to reveal his anonymous informants
would deter such sources from confiding their information,
35. Id. at 16.
36. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973).
37. In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970); State v.
Knops, 183 N.W.2d 93 (Wis. 1971).
38. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 701381).
39. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
40. Brief for the American Newspapers Guild as Amicus Curiae at 6, Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see Freedom of the Press Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Congress, 2d
Sess. 416-38, 669-780, 988-97 (1972).
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thereby imposing an indirect burden on the constitutionally
prescribed role of an informing press. Justice White, writing for
the Court, appeared to concede much to the Free Press Clause
argument, stating: "Nor is it suggested that news gathering
does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated."4' But Justice White's final analysis resulted
only in a deeper and more explicit drawing of the line first
etched in Zemel v. Rusk between the accumulation and publication of information. The Court stated that "these cases involve
no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or
implied command that the press publish what it prefers to
withhold."42 Under this analysis, the Court reasoned that the
process of gathering information from confidential sources was
entitled to no constitutional protection.
Branzburg was an explicit rejection of the press claim to an
independent right-to-gather information. Justice White made
direct reference to the burgeoning literature on the subject and
expressly disavowed it.' The press tried twice again in that
decade and suffered even more emphatic rejection. In Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily News,4" the police obtained a routine search
warrant to search the "photographic laboratories, filing cabinets,
desks and wastepaper baskets"4 6 of the Stanford student
newspaper for evidence of the identities of university students
involved in an assault upon the police. The newspaper claimed
that a routine search of the confidential files of a press
organization, even if otherwise valid under to the Fourth
Amendment, imposed such a burden on the news gathering process that it was effectively proscribed by the First Amendment.
The Court, however, discredited the claim, finding that the
burden such searches imposed on publication was merely "incremental" in 47nature and not sufficient to make a "constitutional
difference."

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 681 n.20.
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
Id. at 551.
Id. at 566.
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In Herbert v. Lando,4" the Court rejected a claim of press
privilege to a facet of news gathering even more closely connected with the consummate act of publication. The plaintiff, a
"public figure" 9 for defamation law purposes, brought a libel
suit against various media defendants in which he was required
to prove that the underlying publications were the product of
"actual malice." ° The media defendants asserted an "editorial
privilege" to prevent the plaintiff from making any direct inquiries into their state of mind during the course of publication.
Again, the Court found no independent editorial privilege distinct from the protection accorded to the publication itself.
Certainly the most explicit repudiation of the argument that
the First Amendment might be wielded as a sword of access to
a criminal trial or other government-controlled information
occurred in the prison right-of-access cases. The Supreme Court
decided three such cases in the mid-1970s 1 In each case, the
press attempted to capitalize on the favorable dicta in the
right-to-gather cases to assert a right of access to prison facilities for the purposes of newsgathering. The result was not only
a rejection of the claim to a right of access, but also a more
profound disclaimer of the underlying right-to-know principle.
5 2 and Saxbe v. WashThe first two cases, Pell v. Procunier
ington Post Co., were decided together. Pell involved a California state regulation prohibiting journalists from obtaining
interviews with inmates of their choice, and Saxbe involved a
comparable regulation promulgated by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. The press plaintiffs alleged that the effective denial of
access to inmates having particular information or experiences
relating to prison conditions or management was an unconstitutional burden on their right to gather and publish news on an
issue of great public concern. The Court found that access to
such information was totally denied in neither case. The prisons
in question permitted members of the press to visit the institu-

48. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
49. Id. at 156 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).
50. Id. (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
51. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. P:ocunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
52. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
53. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
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tions and to interview randomly selected inmates. Therefore,
reasoned the Court, the press had access to all information
otherwise available to members of the public, and there was no
basis for a press claim to greater-than-equal access to government information. The Court constructed the issue as one in
which the press sought to claim a superior privilege vis-a-vis
the general public and chose to reiterate its resolution of that
same issue in Branzburg: "It has generally been held that the
First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional
right of special access to information not available to the public
generally."'
What was, perhaps, most startling about the Court's adverse
rulings on this issue was that both opinions were authored by
Justice Stewart. It was the strong, apparently pro-press dissent
of Justice Stewart in Branzburg upon which the plaintiffs were
principally relying in Pell and Saxbe. Yet, by his apparent misconstruction of the issue in the prison cases, Justice Stewart
was able to focus on the rights of the press vis-A-vis the general public rather than the government itself. His opinion silently
assumed that the general public had no constitutionally protected right of access to government facilities, and thereby inferred
that the press, even when viewed as the self-informing representative of that public, had no independent right to information that could legitimately be denied to that very public. "It is
one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of
information not available to members of the general public....
It is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to
journalists sources of information not available to members of
the public generally. That proposition finds no support in55 the
words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court."
This miscasting of the issue as one of comparative access
between the press and general public, rather than one of
threshold press access to proscribed sources of government information, left the latter issue apparently unresolved in Pell
and Saxbe. The media was therefore constrained-in order to
avoid preemptive resolution by the no-greater-access doctrine of

54. 417 U.S. at 833 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972)).
55. Id. at 834.
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Branzburg-to raise the independent press access issue in a
setting where there was no underlying entitlement to access by
the general public.
This issue arose in Houchins v. KQED.56 An inmate at a
county jail had committed suicide in a notorious area of the
facility reputed to be the scene of numerous "rapes, beatings
and adverse physical conditions."" This area of the prison was
not open to members of the public under any circumstances,
and KQED, which had been reporting the prison conditions
story on both radio and TV, was denied permission to enter and
film that area of the facility. KQED sought to enjoin the denial
of access in federal district court and was granted relief. The
trial court enjoined the prison from enforcing its no-access policy, ruling that the press had to be provided with access at reasonable times and under reasonable conditions. 8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction, finding that the no-greater-access doctrine of Pell and
Saxbe was not controlling in the circumstance of total closure to
both press and public.59
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of only three justices, 0
once again cast the issue in its narrowest terms as one of mere
comparative access,61 yet went on to write by far the broadest
opinion to date rejecting the very premises of a press claim to
some threshold entitlement regarding access to government
information. Chief Justice Burger restored the essential dichotomy relied upon in Zemel v. Rusk 2 between unprotected pre-

56. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 6.
59. KQED v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1976) rev'd, 429 U.S. 1341
(1978). ("Implicit in the trial court's memorandum granting the preliminary injunctions is the finding that the First Amendment rights of both the public and the
news media were infringed by appellant's restrictive policy.").
60. The case was decided by a 4-3 vote with Justice Stewart concurring separately. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 2 (1978). The two who did not take part, Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, presumably would have added one vote to each side.
61. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3 ("The question presented is whether the news media
have a constitutional right of access to a county jail, over and above that of other
persons, to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and photographs for
publication and broadcast by newspapers, radio, and television.").
62. 281 U.S. 1 (1965). See supra text accompanying note 43.

1995]

"DANCING IN THE COURTHOUSE"

253

3
He expublication activities and the protected act itself.1
plained that references in two leading First Amendment cases
to the "importance of informed public opinion and the traditional role of a free press as a source of public information"" did
not amount to a press right of access to information. "[An
analysis of those cases reveals that the Court was concerned
with the freedom of the media to communicate information once
it is obtained; neither case intimated that the Constitution
compels the government to provide the media with information
or access to it on demand." 5 From here it was but a short
step to the Court's ultimate repudiation of any tacit recognition
of the press claim to access. "This Court has never intimated a
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources
of information within government control. Nor does the rationale of the decisions upon which respondents rely lead to the
implication of such a right."66 Houchins gave every appearance
of being the final word on the attempt to refashion the First
Amendment as an affirmative right of access to government
information.67

C. From Gannett to Richmond. Public Trial vs. Public Access
Meanwhile, an even more troubling issue of access had
emerged for the nation's press. Trial courts across the country
had begun to exclude the press from a variety of courtroom
proceedings in criminal cases. This setback was indeed an ironic development, for it was a direct result of the recent success
of the press in restricting the authority of trial courts to impose
direct restraints on the reporting of criminal proceedings.
Trial courts found themselves caught in the crossfire of the
apparently competing interests of a fair trial and a free press.

63. "MThe appellant in Zemel made essentially the same argument that respondents advance here." Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11.
64. Id. at 9 (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936);
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Sarah G. Reznek, Gannett v. DePasquale and Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia: Re-opening Courtroom Doors and Constitutional Windows, 10 CAP. U. L. REV.
101, 102 (1980) ("The door to access was securely closed by the Court .. . in a triad
of cases concerning public and media access to prisons.").
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In Sheppard v. Maxwell," the 1966 Supreme Court ruling that
inaugurated the modern era of fair trial/free press doctrine, the
Court recognized the need to safeguard the trial process from
the "increasingly prevalent " " occurrence of unfair and prejudicial news coverage of criminal cases. Trial courts were admonished to take "strong measures to ... prevent the prejudice at
its inception." 7' A number of trial courts took this injunction at
face value and issued so-called gag orders restraining the press
from reporting on a variety of matters in pending cases.7 ' The
lower appellate courts were inclined to uphold these restraining
72 The
orders on the authority of Sheppard.
escalating conflict
between the courts and the press came to a head when one
such pretrial gag order was reviewed by the Supreme Court in
8 which
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,"
was, of course, to
become a landmark First Amendment case.
In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court reviewed a relatively
unremarkable restraining order that prohibited the press from
reporting on a variety of matters that were "strongly
implicative"74 of the guilt of the multiple-murder defendant.
The immediate result was an emphatic reaffirmation of the
values of a free press and a near-absolute prohibition on the
type of gag order at issue." Nebraska Press effectively re-

68. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
69. Id. at 362.
70. Id. at 362-63.
71. See A.B.A. LEGAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, RECOMMENDED COURT PROCEDURE TO ACCOMMODATE RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE
PRESS (1976).

72. Ten years after Sheppard was decided, one of the amici curiae in the Nebraska Press case implored the Court to "resolve the growing legal confusion and institutional hostility between the press and the courts which has developed in the decade
since this Court's decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell." Brief for The Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press Legal Defense and Research Fund as Amicus Curiae at
11, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (No. 75-817).
73. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
74. Id. at 541.
75. Id. at 559 ("The thread running through all [our] cases is that prior restraints
on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement
on First Amendment rights . . . For the same reasons the protection against prior restraint should have particular force as applied to reporting of criminal proceedings. ... ."). Justice Brennan, joined by two other Justices, would have imposed an
absolute ban on such prior restraints. Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring). And Justice White expressed "grave doubt" that such a prior restraint could ever be upheld.
Id. at 570 (White, J., concurring).
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moved the restraining order on the press from the arsenal of
the trial court. However, the extended consequence to the press
was more double-edged. Trial courts increasingly began to experiment with another remedial measure for cutting off the flow
of prejudicial publicity at its inception. Judges began to close
courtrooms to the press and public. 6 This alternative was
equally as effective as a gag order, did not involve a direct
prior restraint upon publication, and found ample authority in
Sheppard where the Court had insisted that "the presence of
the press at judicial proceedings must be limited when it is
apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or
disadvantaged.""
The Supreme Court agreed to review one such closure order
7
in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.
Two defendants had been indicted for a murder in a rural area of upstate New York and
had filed pretrial motions to suppress certain physical evidence
as well as statements they had made to the police. Two local
Gannett newspapers had been following the unfolding story of
the murder, the investigation, and the out-of-state arrest of the
two defendants. On the day scheduled for the pretrial suppression hearing, a Gannett reporter was in the courtroom. The
defense moved to exclude the press and public from the
courtroom to protect the fair trial interests of the accused. The
prosecution did not object, and the judge issued the
exclusionary order. New York's highest court upheld the order
principally on the authority of Sheppard.9
Gannett appeared to present the press petitioners with a
clear opportunity to regain some of the ground lost with the
earlier claims of access to government information. For one
thing, the facts could readily be viewed as a straightforward

76. "Since this Court indicated in Nebraska Press that orders restraining the
press from publishing information obtained in open court proceedings would rarely be
consistent with the First Amendment, trial courts around the country have with increasing frequency sought to achieve the same result by denying the press access to
such information by holding judicial proceedings in secret." Brief of the American
Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No. 77-1301).
77. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
78. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
79. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 372 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y. 1977).

256

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:237

attempt by the trial court to circumvent the clear command of
Nebraska Press not to restrain reporting on court proceedings. o Furthermore, Gannett could be distinguished from the
earlier cases on principled grounds. The prior access cases had
all attempted to unlock a door to information traditionally within the exclusive domain of the Executive Branch. The claim in
Gannett did not require the Court to unlock any such doors; it
required only that the Judiciary police itself against closing
doors that had traditionally been left open. Also, there was no
basis in the record for treating the claim as one for a greaterthan-equal access by the press. The trial court had been sealed
to press and public alike for the express purpose of preventing
information from reaching the public.
Made wary, perhaps, by the consistent and emphatic rejection
of the First Amendment claims to access in the earlier cases,
the press petitioners introduced a new claim in Gannett. They
argued that press access to a criminal trial was independently
grounded in another provision of the Constitution, the Public
Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.8 This was a relatively
novel assertion that was said to support the claim to access in
two rather distinct ways. First, it was argued that the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial ran to the public as well as
to the accused." Therefore, the press argued that the public
has a directly and independently enforceable right of access to a
defendant's trial. Second, the press argued that a full appreciation of the contextual guarantees of the First Amendment required that it be read together with those other rights, such as
the right of public trial, which shared the common, and ultimate, constitutional objective of an informed democracy. 3 The
essential argument here was that the First Amendment both
presumed and protected the right of the citizenry to information
concerning the exercise of the political power to prosecute. This
approach did not require the determination that the public had

80. This was the lead argument in Gannett's petition for certiorari. Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 7, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No. 771301).
81. Brief of Petitioner at 34, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No.
77-1301) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI) ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
.....
).
82. Brief of Petitioner at 34-44, Gannett Co. (No. 77-1301).
83. Id.
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independent standing to raise an access claim under the Sixth
Amendment, but rather simply that the putative First Amendment right of access was, in several respects, informed by the
collateral guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.
The new Sixth Amendment claim put forth in Gannett was
controversial in several respects. Most obviously, it challenged
the apparently settled understanding of the Sixth Amendment
as a set of rights specifically and exclusively designated for "the
accused." There was very little in case law or other legal authority to support the claim of a derivative entitlement by the
public or press.' The Sixth Amendment argument was also
controversial because it tended to compromise and limit the
press claim to access to judicial proceedings. To the extent the
First Amendment was read to derive its authority to compel
press access from the public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment, it operated to confine press access only to those proceedings protected by that clause. At its best, therefore, the claim of
ancillary entitlement to public access recognized by the Sixth
Amendment would leverage the primary press claim grounded
in the First Amendment; at its worst, the argument would
displace the preeminent force of the First Amendment claim
and provide a more ready target for the anti-access sentiment
on the Court. The worst happened.
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court upheld the
closure order in Gannett. There was little else about this "spectacularly controversial case"85 that was quite so definite. Although the petitioners had relied principally upon the First
Amendment to challenge the closure order, this issue all but
disappeared from the five separate opinions in the case. The
matter was treated by the Justices on both sides almost exclusively as a Sixth Amendment issue. Indeed, the only two Justices who appeared to acknowledge that there was a First Amendment claim were in the majority.86 The dissenters all joined
84. The only case to have adopted the new Sixth Amendment argument was
United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978). The closest the Supreme
Court had come to recognizing third party interests was in cases like Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). These cases
held that such interests could be taken into account by the Court when deciding
whether to grant a defendant's waiver of a specific Sixth Amendment right.
85. BeVier, supra note 20, at 489.
86. These were Justice Stewart, 443 U.S. at 392, and Justice Powell, 433 U.S. at
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Justice Blackmun's opinion which did not address the First
Amendment issue and even appeared to forsake it."
Once again, Justice Stewart authored the opinion for the
Court denying press access. He began his discussion with a
reference to Sheppard and the trial court's "affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity."8 He then offered a rather unqualified endorsement of
closure as a remedial measure within the broad discretion of
the trial judge: "Closure of pretrial proceedings is often one of
the most effective methods that a trial judge can employ to
attempt to ensure"89 trial fairness. He acknowledged the long
common law tradition of public trials but held it to nothing
more than that-a common law tradition that established only
a common law rule.9 ° With respect to the public trial provision
of the Sixth Amendment, Justice Stewart found that its protection was in the nature of a shield held only by the accused.
"The Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access to a
criminal trial on the part of the public; its guarantee, like the
others enumerated, is personal to the accused."9 '
Justice Blackmun's dissent argued essentially that the common law tradition of open trials had indeed been incorporated
into the Sixth Amendment as a right that ran to the public as
well as the accused. There was an extraordinary amount of rich
historical material to support the policy argument that public
trials served a public good beyond the specific interests of the
accused-and Justice Blackmun made use of most of it 92 -but
there was virtually no legal authority to support such thirdparty standing for any of the rights specified in the Sixth
Amendment. Indeed, as Justice Stewart noted pointedly in his
majority opinion, even Justice Blackmun had previously appeared to acknowledge that Sixth Amendment rights were re397.
87. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
88. 443 U.S. at 378.
89. Id. at 379.
90. Id. at 384.
91. Id. at 379.
92. In the subsequent case, where Justice Blackmun found himself in the majority, he said he found it "gratifying" to find the Court "relying upon legal history in
determining the fundamental public character of the criminal trial." Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 601 (1980).
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served to the accused." The only case authority to acknowledge third-party standing-but not necessarily even third-party
rights-under the Sixth Amendment was a single, recent case
decided by the Third Circuit, United States v. Cianfrani.4
Cianfrani held that the press, by virtue of the strong public
interest in open proceedings, had standing under the public
trial provision of the Sixth Amendment to challenge the trial
court's closure of a pretrial suppression hearing. Justice
Blackmun followed the contours of the Cianfrani opinion but
also took it one step further. He concluded that the Sixth
Amendment conferred up to the public not merely a litigable
interest, but a direct constitutional right of access.95 He also
found that modern pretrial suppression hearings were "the close
equivalent of the trial on the merits" 96 ana that the Public
Trial Clause, therefore, included such proceedings.9 7
In retrospect, Gannett has acquired the aura of a judicial
"slip-and-fall," a quirky case that simply caught the Justices off
stride in their ongoing reaction to an insistent, yet compelling,
quest for political access.9 8 However, at the moment of decision, it appeared to be the equal of the Supreme Court's other
one-vote majorities, like Branzburg and Houchins, which effectively foreclosed the development of a public right-of-access doctrine. 9 What was perhaps most striking about the Gannett
opinions was their virtual dismissal of the First Amendment
claim to access.' 0 The majority opinion merely concluded that

93. "I believe the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are personal to the
accused. . . ." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 848 (1975).

94. 573 F.2d. 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
95. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 446.
96. Id. at 436.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., James C. Goodale, Gannett: Loopholes May Send Case Way of
Court's Other Aberrations, NATL L.J., Aug. 13, 1979, at 56.
99. One noted commentator, writing shortly after Gannett was decided, concluded
that "the public's 'right-to-know' is not emerging, but is rather likely to continue to
be submerged in dicta and dissenting opinions." David M. O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right-to-Know", 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 630 (1980).
100. The Justices were not alone in their apparent sense that pursuing the First
Amendment claim was no longer a promising endeavor. Immediately prior to the
Court's decision in Gannett, the American Bar Association released its revised
standards for courtroom closures. The new standards took a very pro-access position,
equating closure with a prior restraint on the press and utilizing a First Amendment
formula of restriction, yet argued that the revised standards were grounded in the
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if there were such a right, it had been satisfied by the modest
findings of the trial judge.1"' But Justice Blackmun's dissent
arguably went even further. His opinion appeared designed to
enhance the propriety of his Sixth Amendment approach to trial
access by disavowing the pertinence of the First Amendment
claim to such access. Although he claimed that he "need not
reach the issue of First Amendment access,""0 2 he also made it
clear that he saw nothing to be gained by that approach. He
referred to the petitioner's argument that the public and press
had a First Amendment right to gather information protected
by the right to publish, and retorted: "I do not agree ....
[Tihis
case involves no restraint upon publication ....
It involves an

issue of access to a judicial proceeding."' 3 Indeed, he appeared to affirm the rejection of the First Amendment approach, stating:
This Court heretofore has not found, and does not today
find, any First Amendment right of access to judicial or
other governmental proceedings ....

One turns then, in-

stead, to that provision of the Constitution that speaks most
directly to the question of access to judicial proceedings,
namely, the public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.' °4
It therefore appeared at least temporarily settled that the First
Amendment provided scant claim to access to governmental
information, even when generated within a much-revered institution originally designed for compulsory public attendance.'
The critical reaction to Gannett, though perhaps predictable,
was exceptionally strident. The New York Times immediately
accused the Court of "endorsing secrecy,"0 6 and the academic
journals soon followed suit.' 7 The public counterreaction of
public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 8-3.2 (1979).

101. "[T]his putative right was given all appropriate deference by the state nisi
prius court in the present case." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 392
(1978).
102. Id. at 447.
103. Id.

104. Id. at 411.
105. Id. at 368.
106. Private Justice, Public Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1979, at A16.

107. Justice Blackmun later made pointed reference to some of this literature.
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the Justices themselves, however, was even more extraordinary.
Gannett was decided in early July, 1979. By the end of that
summer, in direct response to the immediate "tide of criticism"" 8 sweeping over the Court, four individual justices had
made exceptional, and exceptionally defensive, extrajudicial
statements in the public forum. 9 Then, in October, Justice
Brennan contributed the most extended public response to
Gannett in an address that was subsequently published." Indeed, the unprecedented outpouring of reaction on all sides has
been viewed as distinctly cathartic and ultimately
transformative of First Amendment doctrine. Several noted
Court commentators have even concluded that the regeneration
of First Amendment doctrine occasioned the following year in
Richmond Newspapers would not have occurred without the
seeming death blows delivered by Gannett."' And, as if the
popular reaction in print were not generating sufficient heat,
there was the dramatic response of the trial courts across the
nation to the new closure mandates of Gannett. Prior to
Gannett, there were apparently no reported instances of complete trial or suppression hearing closures." 2 But in an informal survey that began with the date of the Gannett decision, it
was revealed that within the following year there were at least
272 motions made to close some portion of a criminal case, and
that 146 of them were granted. Moreover, forty-seven of these
motions had been
directed at the trial itself, and thirty-three of
3
granted."
them
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 602 n.1 (1980).
108. Reznek, supra note 67, at 114 n.66.
109. The four justices were: Justice Burger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
Justice Powell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1979, at 13; and Justices Blackmun
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1979, at 41.
110. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Dedication
Newhouse Center for Law and Justice (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERS

1979, at 18;
and Stevens,
for the S.I.
L. REV. 173

(1979).

111. Cox, supra note 6, at 24 ("To correct an unwarranted departure from 'our
system of justice'--and perhaps to escape further pummeling by the press-the Court
was drawn into creating yet another new federal constitutional right."); Anthony Lewis, A Public Right-to-Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment as Sword,
1980 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14 ("I am convinced . . . that Gannett in fact helped significantly to create the conditions for Supreme Court acceptance of a doctrine of public
access to public institutions under the First Amendment.").
112. "If any such cases exist, which is doubtful, they are few indeed." Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 431 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. THE REPORTER'S COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, COURT WATCH SUM-
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Exactly one week after the decision in Gannett, the Virginia
Supreme Court relied upon it to uphold the closure order of the
trial court in Hanover County, Virginia, which had excluded the
Richmond Newspapers reporters from the fourth murder trial of
John Paul Stephenson. This otherwise obscure case, with no
reported opinion by any lower court, thus entered upon a fast
track to the Supreme Court. Notice of appeal from the July 9,
1979 Virginia Supreme Court ruling was filed on August 13,
1979;... the case was argued the following February; and, perhaps not entirely by coincidence, the decision was released exactly one year to the day after the decision in Gannett. The
seven-to-one".5 reversal of the closure order in Richmond
Newspapers, relying entirely upon the First Amendment, represented an extraordinary reevaluation by, and realignment of,
the Court on the issue of access. It was, as Justice Stevens
described it, "a watershed case. " "' Thus, within the space of a
single year, Richmond Newspapers did for Gannett what
Sullivan"' had done for Chaplinsky,"' and what
Grosjean"9 had done for Schenck:2 it restructured the core
meaning of the First Amendment to advance the central political purposes of the Constitution. The shield of the First Amend2
ment had for the first time developed a cutting edge.1 '

MARY (Aug. 1980).
114. The Supreme Court was to decide later that, although appellate jurisdiction
did not lie, the notice of appeal would be treated as a petition for certiorari, and the
case was properly before it. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 562
(1980).
115. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 604.
116. Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that prosecution for
seditious libel is inconsistent with the central protection of the First Amendment).
118. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that libel is not
within the protection of the First Amendment).
119. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (holding that the central
purpose of the First Amendment is to protect informed public opinion, which is
broader than protecting against prior restraints).
120. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding that the central purpose of the First Amendment is to protect against prior restraints).
121. Cf Lewis, supra note 111.
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D. The Richmond Newspaper Doctrine:A Quick Measure
We will return to Richmond Newspapers in the following
section to provide a close reading of the remarkable, yet under
appreciated, new theory of First Amendment access adopted by
the Supreme Court. But it will presently serve our purposes to
focus on, and underscore, the truly "watershed" quality of this
case by first taking a quick look at the actual doctrine which
has spilled forth in little more than a decade. Neither the individual cases nor the scant literature on the new right adequately reveal the extraordinary character of the doctrinal transformations wrought by Richmond Newspapers.
There are three aspects to the emerging doctrine worth summarizing. The first is the forceful, yet short-lived, role of the
Supreme Court in guiding the doctrine. The Court quickly decided three more access cases which confirmed, but did not
significantly expand, the new right. Since 1986, however, the
Court has abandoned the field to the initiatives of the lower
courts. The second aspect of significance is the extraordinary
expansion of the new right of access by the lower courts. The
cases quickly extended the new right to virtually all legal proceedings, civil as well as criminal, and then to the multivarious
documents attendant to those proceedings. The courts have
floundered, however, in their various attempts to extend the
right of access to non-judicial proceedings or documents. The
third aspect of the doctrine worth highlighting is the expanding
dissonance of the contemporary laws of access. There are now
multiple bodies of access law, none of which are internally
settled or externally consistent with one another. As one circuit
court remarked, judges confronted with a claim to access are
now required to enter a "legal minefield"'22 of conflicting and
overlapping laws.
1. The Supreme Court Cases
Since Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court has decided
only three First Amendment access cases and one closely relat-

122. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Blain, 808 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1987).
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ed Sixth Amendment public trial case. 2' Although these cases
did verify the Court's commitment to the abruptly promulgated
right of access, they only marginally expanded the scope of the
right. Essentially, the successor cases merely extended Richmond Newspaper's critical concept of the "criminal trial" to
several closely related criminal proceedings.
The first case was Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court.2 4 In Globe, the defendant was charged with the rape
of three minor girls. Pursuant to a state statute, the trial court
closed the courtroom during the trial testimony of the minor
victims. The Massachusetts Supreme Court found that the closure presented an exception to the Richmond Newspapers right
of access because the state's historical practice had been to
require closure during such testimony. The Supreme Court held
that the mandatory closure provision violated the First Amendment. The Court found that the right of access applied to all
criminal trials, regardless of any particularized closure practices, 25 and emphasized the state's heavy burden to demonstrate
a "compelling governmental interest"'26 to support closure.
Globe was noteworthy because it produced the first opinion for
the Court on the First Amendment right of access. That opinion
was written by Justice Brennan, immediately establishing him
as the principal exponent of the new right. The case was also
noteworthy for its explicit and controversial disregard for the
traditional practice of closing the testimony of minor rape vic127
tims.
The next case was Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
(I).128 This case involved the capital trial of a defendant
charged with the rape-murder of a teenage girl. The trial court
had closed the courtroom during the individual voir dire of the
prospective jurors. The Court held that the Richmond right
applied to the voir dire since "[t]he process of jury selection is

123. The Supreme Court has also issued a summary reversal of a Puerto Rico
statute that required the closure of a preliminary hearing at the defendant's request.
El Vocero De Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 113 S. Ct. 2004 (1993).
124. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
125. Id. at 605 n.13.
126. Id. at 606-07.
127. Chief Justice Burger wrote a stinging dissent on this point. Id. at 612-13.
128. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
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itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but
to the criminal justice system."12 9 Chief Justice Burger wrote
the opinion for a unanimous court and returned to a principled
reliance
on the specific historical tradition of open jury selec130
tion.
The fourth and last of the Supreme Court cases bore the
same name as the third. Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court
(II)... involved a nurse charged with the murder by poisoning
of twelve patients. The trial court closed the courtroom during
the forty-one-day preliminary hearing. The California Supreme
Court held that the Richmond right applied "only to actual
criminal trials.""2 The Supreme Court held, in an opinion
again by Chief Justice Burger, that the preliminary hearing in
California was "sufficiently like a trial to justify the same conclusion"'
and therefore found that the closure violated the
First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has never directly returned, since its
controversial decision in Gannett Newspapers, to the issue of
the right of access to a suppression hearing in a criminal case.
However, it did do so indirectly in Waller v. Georgia.'3 4 In
Waller the trial court had closed the courtroom over the
defendant's objection during a seven-day suppression hearing
concerning the state's wiretap evidence. The Supreme Court
held this closure violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial, finding that "suppression hearings often
are as important as the trial itself."'35 The Court then expressly announced that the Sixth Amendment standard for
closure of a suppression hearing was identical to the First
Amendment standard of the Richmond Newspapers line of
cases.3 6 Therefore, although no single case has expressly done
so, the combination of Richmond Newspapers and Waller has
effectively overruled Gannett.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 505.
Id.
478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 12.
467 U.S. 39 (1984).
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
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2. The Lower Court Cases
The holding in Richmond Newspapers, in removing the doctrinal barrier to recognizing a public right of access to governmental information, operated like the finger removed from the
dike. There was an immediate and unrestrained rush of lower
court case law that appeared to move simultaneously in all
directions. It is not feasible to reduce this explosion of case law
to any simple paradigm of development. But it is possible at
least to characterize the terminological stages of expansion. The
first stage simply carried forward the work of the Supreme
Court cases in extending the right of access beyond the "trial"
itself to virtually every legal "proceeding."'37 The next stage
was represented by the extension of the concept of a legal proceeding to include all the "related" documents, papers, and
exhibits. 8' The third stage has been represented by the lower
courts' continuing failed attempts to extend the right beyond
legal proceedings and documents to various forms of non-judicial governmental information. It will be possible here only to
illustrate by example these various stages of the case law.
The cases have extended the Richmond right of access to the
following legal proceedings: suppression hearings; 39 bail
hearings;'4 ° sentencing hearings;
change of venue hearings;"' plea hearings;"
contempt proceedings;'
pretrial
137. "It makes little sense to recognize a right of public access to criminal courts

and then limit that right to the trial phase of a criminal proceeding, something that
occurs in only a small fraction of criminal cases." New York Times v. Biaggi (I), 828
F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987). "Because the taking of a guilty plea serves as a substitute for a trial, it may reasonably be treated in the same manner as a trial for First
Amendment purposes." Washington Post Co. v. Soussoudis, 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th
Cir. 1986).
138. "There is no reason to distinguish between pretrial proceedings and the documents filed in regard to them. Indeed, the two principal justifications for the first
amendment right of access to criminal proceedings apply, in general, to pretrial documents." Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
1983).
139. Herald Co. v. Klepfer, 734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Brooklier,
685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
140. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983).
141. United States v. Byrd, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1804 (D.S.C. 1992).
142. Charlotte Observer v. Bakker, 882 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1989).
143. Washington Post Co. v. Soussoudis, 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986).
144. In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1983).
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ex parte recusal proceedings;14 5 post-conviction proceedings;14 6 parole revocation hearings; 4 7 parole release
hearings; 4 8 executions;'
bench conferences; ' ° chambers
courts martial; 5 3
conferences;"' juvenile proceedings;"'
5
4
civil case proceedings;
preliminary injunction proceedings;' 55 and, to be sure, closure proceedings. 6'
The cases have also extended the First Amendment right of
access to the following documents: indictments; 5 7 all motion
documents;' 5 8 all pretrial documents; ' 9 post-trial
62
6
documents; 6 ' closed criminal case files;' ' trial exhibits;
63
plea hearing documents;'6
recusal motion documents;'
16
5
sealed plea agreements;
bail hearing documents;'6 6 submitted Criminal Justice Administration (CJA) forms; 167 affidavits
of already-executed search warrants;"6 jury lists;6 9 juror
145. Storer Communications v. Presser, 828 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1987).
146. CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1985).
147. Herald Co. v. Board of Parole, 499 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
148. Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (l1th Cir. 1983).
149. KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see
William B. & Beth S. Brinkmann, Televising Executions: The FirstAmendment Issues,
32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135 (1992).
150. United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708 (lth Cir. 1993) (holding that the
conference itself may be closed, but the transcript of the conference must be released
at the earliest reasonable point). But see United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111
(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 828 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub. nom. TimesPicayune Pub. Corp. v. Edwards, 485 U.S. 934 (1988); United States v. Moody, 746 F.
Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
151. CNN v. United States, 824 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v.
Smith, 787 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1986).
152. In re Chase, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1982).
153. United States v. Hershey, 20 M.J. 433 (C.M.A. 1985).
154. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
155. Stanley Works v. Newell Co., 21 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1120 (D. Conn. 1993).
156. Storer Communications, Inc. v. Presser, 828 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1987).
157. United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985).
158. New York Times v. Biaggi, 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
977 (1988).
159. Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court (DeLorean), 705 F.2d 1143 (9th
Cir. 1983).
160. CBS v. United States Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1985).
161. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1993).
162. United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1985).
163. Storer Communications, Inc. v. Presser, 828 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1987).
164. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986).
165. United States v. Haler, 837 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1988).
166. Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1988).
167. United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1989).
168. In re Search Warrant, 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
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1 7 ° appellate briefs; 17' and all documents
questionnaires;
in a
72

1
civil suit.

The lower courts have been much less successful in extending
the right of access to non-judicial proceedings or documents.
Several cases have held straightforwardly that the First
Amendment right of access does not extend to government information outside the Judicial Branch.1 73 The seminal case
that appears to find a First Amendment right of access to executive information involved the very narrow issue of a
broadcaster's right to equal access to cover certain "limited
coverage" events at the White House. 74 Subsequent cases, although ultimately vacated or reversed on appeal, have initially
found a right of access to the following governmental information: judicial review board proceedings;1 75 federal administrative fact-finding hearings; 7 6 state legislative meetings; 7 7 city
council meetings; 7 ' and governor's executive travel

169. In re Globe Newspaper Co. v. Hurley, 920 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1990). But see
United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the First
Amendment was not violated by redaction of juror names from transcript), reh'g denied, 828 F.2d 772, cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988).
170. United States v. George, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1511 (D.D.C. 1992).
171. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 983 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 62
U.S.L.W. 3551 (1994).
172. Johnson v. Turner Constr. Co., 598 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
173. The leading case is Capital Cities Media v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir.
1986) (en banc) (state environmental agency records); see also ACLU of Miss. v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1990) (records of state agency dedicated to maintaining racial segregation); Calder v. I.R.S., 890 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1989) (I.R.S. records of Al Capone); Combined Communications Corp. of Okla., Inc. v. Boger, 689 F.
Supp. 1065 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (NCAA letter of inquiry to state college); Dean v.
Guste, 414 So. 2d 862 (La. Ct. App.) (school board executive session), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1070 (1982).
174. CNN v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981); see also WPIX, Inc. v.
League of Women Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (right of equal access to
presidential debates).
175. First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 579 F. Supp.
192 (E.D. Pa. 1984), vacated, 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986).
176. Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 (D.
Utah 1985), vacated, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987).
177. League of Women Voters v. Adams, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1433 (Alaska
Super. Ct. 1986) (holding based on Alaska state constitution but relying upon Richmond Newspapers doctrine), rev'd sub. nom. Abood v. League of Women Voters, 743
P.2d 333 (Alaska 1987).
178. WJW-TV, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 686 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1988), vacated, 878 F.2d 906 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), vacated, 870 F.2d 658, cert. denied, 110
S.Ct. 74 (1989).
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records.' 9 Therefore, it is a fair summary of the doctrine to
state that the First Amendment right of access has been extended to almost every variety of legal proceeding or document,
but it has not been so extended beyond the courthouse.
3. The Mounting Dissonance
Despite the overwhelming trend of the case law to expand
the reach of the public right of access, the path has not been
smooth. There are several varieties of dissonance within the
contemporary law of access. One area of confusion derives simply from the indefinite, inchoate character of the doctrine. As
will be developed more fully in the next section, the Supreme
Court cases have relied upon "two complementary considerations" 8 ° as the structural bases for finding a First Amendment right of access to designated information. The first is a
tradition of openness ('history" prong), and the other is the
instrumental utility of access to proper governmental functioning ("functional" prong). This two-prong test adequately served
the Supreme Court's construction of a right of access to the
venerable institution of the American criminal jury trial. But
the test has not traveled well. In most respects, it fails to justify the extraordinary extension of the right of access to proceedings and documents with no real history of access and no real
utility to the governing process. 8 ' Many courts have in fact
quite explicitly forsaken the two-prong standard while at the
same time extending the right.'82
The overly qualified definition of the First Amendment right
of access has contributed to the parallel development of alternative bodies of access law. This has provided another dimension
of dissonance, for there are now multiple sources of access law

179. El Dia, Inc. v. Colon, 783 F. Supp. 15 (D.P.R. 1991), rev'd, 963 F.2d 488 (1st
Cir. 1992).
180. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
181. "[T]he (two-prong) test is seriously flawed, for it both abandons the Court's established approach to First Amendment adjudication and bears little relation to the
underlying rationale for the right of access." Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to the 'Right-to-Know"?: Access to Government-Controlled Information Since
Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1987).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) ("the
lack of an historic tradition . . . does not bar . . . a right of access").
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with no clear correspondence among them. The law is now
something of an amalgam of federal constitutional law, state
constitutional law, 8 ' federal statutory law,'8 state statutory
87
18
and state common law.
law; 85 federal common law;
Different courts have almost arbitrarily relied upon different
bodies of law to resolve common issues of access, often arriving
at different results.'8 8
A poignant illustration of this doctrinal dissonance occurs
when courts find that an inferior body of law effectively prevails over the First Amendment law of access. For instance, the
press often learns, only after the fact, that a legal proceeding
has been conducted in secret. The press then brings a claim of
access to the transcript of the proceeding, claiming a First
Amendment right of access to the proceeding as such. Under
these circumstances, some courts have concluded that although
the claimant did have a constitutionally protected right to attend the proceeding itself, the claimant has only a common law
right to see the transcript of that proceeding. Therefore, a
claimant who is constitutionally entitled to access to information presented at a proceeding, yet denied access to that pro-

183. See, e.g., In re Keene Sentinel, 612 A.2d 911 (N.H. 1992) (N.H. CONST. pt. I,
art. VIII); Oregonian Publishing Co. v. OLeary, 736 P.2d 173 (Or. 1987) (OR. CONST.
art. I, sec. 10); Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 848 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1993)
(WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10). Florida will remain at the cutting edge of access law
with the recent passage of an "open government" constitutional amendment.
184. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, LITIGATION UNDER
THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS.

185. See, e.g., John J. Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of
Information Act, 38 ARK. L. REV. 268 (1984).
186. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 589 (1978) (holding that
while "courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public
records and documents ....
the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute.").
187. Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1987).
188. The most notorious example of this was the varying responses of the federal
circuit courts to nationwide claims of access to search warrant affidavits filed under
seal as part of a nationwide criminal investigation. Compare In re Search Warrant,
855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that refusal to unseal documents was justified
by compelling government interest), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990); Baltimore Sun
Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating the proposition that only a qualified common law right of access exists) with In re Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74 (2d
Cir.) (finding a common law right to access obviates the need to look to the First
Amendment), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990) and Times Mirror Co. v. United
States, 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that neither a First Amendment nor a
common law right to access exists).
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ceeding, may nonetheless be denied access to the transcript of
that information because a lesser standard of closure is applied
to documents." 9 This result makes little sense and highlights
the kind of structural defect in the doctrine that must be addressed prior to the next generation of case law.
III. THE NEW THEORY OF ACCESS

Concerning the abrupt turnaround by the Supreme Court
from Gannett to Richmond Newspapers, one sage commentator

has noted that, "[niot since Gertrude has anyone posted with
such dexterity from one set of sheets to another."9 ° Indeed,
even the very dexterity of this doctrinal passing has been open
to question. 9 ' For in Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme
Court arguably ignored, rather than informed, traditional First
Amendment doctrine in its efforts to escape the cul-de-sac of its
own access rulings. The Court accomplished this extraordinary
transformation by turning to a popular, yet constitutionally
novel, theory of self-government. This theory was loosely adapted, without explicit or consistent elaboration, from a set of
classical republican ideas commonly associated with the writings of the political scientist and educator, Alexander
Meiklejohn, and other advocates of a people's right-to-know.'92

189. A striking example of this occurred with respect to the trial court's handling
of press claims to access to the transcripts of intercepted tape recordings of the defendant General Noriega. The transcripts were admitted at a previous hearing on a
motion to enjoin the broadcasting of the tapes themselves.
The court notes at the outset that the press has no First Amendment
right of access to the transcripts at issue. Although the press and public
have a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials, the right of
access to judicial records is not of constitutional dimension but rather
derives from common law. Thus, in contrast to the compelling justification required for closure of criminal trials, the trial court has broad latitude where only the common-law right of access to court records is implicated.
United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citations omitted); see also People v. Glogowski, 517 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1987) (constitutional right of
access to videotapes played at hearing extends only to actual in-court viewing;, lesser
common law right of access applies to subsequent viewing and copying).
190. Lewis, supra note 111, at 1 (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc.
2).
191. Perhaps the most cogent, as well as the most pungent, criticisms of the opinions in the case may be found in BeVier, supra note 6.
192. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOv-
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While these political ideas were certainly resonant within the
subtext of First Amendment doctrine, they had the benefit of
almost no explicit legal recognition or adaptation. They were
nonetheless ideas whose time had apparently come.
A. Richmond Newspapers
Richmond Newspapers was certainly a groundbreaking judicial assertion, yet one that spoke with many conflicting voices.19 Despite the apparent inability to recognize a constitutional right of access in the earlier First Amendment case
law, 94 seven of the Justices in Richmond Newspapers found
that the First Amendment required a reversal of the trial closure order.'95 Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. Seven of the
eight Justices who participated in the decision wrote separately.196 Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion was joined by
only two other Justices. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion,
which was subsequently to become the actual touchstone for the
new doctrine of access,' 97 was joined by only one other Justice.
Chief Justice Burger insisted that the case involved merely a

ERNMENT (1948), quoted in Hayes, supra note 181, at 1113 n.14.
193. "Despite the near unanimity of the result in Richmond Newspapers, the Court
was unable to present even the facade of a unifying rationale." BeVier, supra note 6,
at 313.
194. Even the attorney who conducted the oral argument on behalf of Richmond
Newspapers before the Supreme Court began his presentation by arguing the Sixth
Amendment grounds for reversal until Justice Stewart suggested that he move on to
his First Amendment argument. Oral Arguments at 19, Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (No. 79-243).
Justice Stewart: Mr. Tribe, surely, did you rely-I know you rely here,
and I assume you relied in the Virginia courts, on the First Amendment
as well.
Mr. Tribe: I'm about to turn to that.
Justice Stewart: Well, I hope you will.
Id.
195. Justice Powell did not take part in the consideration of the case, although he
had indicated in his concurring opinion in Gannett that he did recognize a press right
of access within the First Amendment. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
196. Only Justice Marshall, who joined the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan,
did not write separately.
197. "Of more lasting importance than the Chief Justice's opinion was the concurrence of Justice Brennan, which became the foundation for subsequent decisions in
this area." Hayes, supra note 181, at 1117.
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"narrow question,"'98 while Justice Stevens declared it to be
nothing less than a "watershed case." 99 The case produced a
quick, although brief, flurry of critical commentary, most of
which applauded
the holding but characterized the opinions as
"-unclear," 2 0o "fail[ing] to articulate a rule,"201 and
"generat[ing] intractable problems of interpretation." 20 2
The opinions in Richmond Newspapers certainly invite critical
examination at a variety of levels, yet much of this work is
already accomplished and need not be extended here. 20 3 What

is of critical concern for present purposes, however, is to identify the essential legal innovation which enabled the Court to elevate its holding beyond the restraints of its own recent and
emphatic precedents. For this purpose, it is possible to restrict
our investigation to the two principal opinions in the
case-those of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan. And
here we see that the critical element behind the Richmond
Newspapers holding is a revised characterization of the American criminal jury trial as a public institution with a political
mandate impliedly guaranteed by the very structural design of
the Constitution.
The opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan
have been duly noted for their ultimately disparate treatment
of the issue of trial access."' But at first glance, the opinions
are strikingly similar. Each opinion, for example, is remarkable
for its almost insouciant disregard of precedent,0 5 leading to
the dissenting barb by Justice Rehnquist that the jurisprudential tone of the opinions was best expressed in a Gilbert and
Sullivan operetta.0 6 More positively, each opinion is outlined
by the same two interrelated concepts: the history and the
198. 448 U.S. at 558.
199. Id. at 582.
200. Note, supra note 6, at 157.
201. Reznek, supra note 67, at 127.
202. BeVier, supra note 6, at 314.
203. See id.; Cox, supra note 6; Craig H. Lubben, Note, First Amendment-Constitutional Right of Access to Criminal Trials, 71 J. CIuM. L. &
CImINOLOGY 547 (1980); Reznek, supra note 67; Note, supra note 6.
204. Note, supra note 6, at 153.
205. [Tlhe prison access cases fairly cry out for reconciliation." BeVier, supra note
6, at 322. "Surely, some effort to explain the relation between the decision in Richmond Newspapers and those earlier cases was required." Cox, supra note 6, at 26.
206. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 604 (1980).
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instrumental utility of open trials. Indeed, the two opinions give
every appearance of having been written decidedly with the
other in mind. Each covers much the same ground but with a
radically different purpose, and ultimately, each appears to suffer from an overextended effort to capture, or reconstruct, the
principal arguments of the other. To be sure, Chief Justice
Burger's opinion, which relies principally on the limiting factor
of tradition, makes an unsuccessful attempt to tie in that factor
with the arguments of instrumental utility. Conversely, Justice
Brennan's opinion relies almost entirely on the more unlimiting
factor of the instrumentalism of open trials, yet exhibits precisely the corresponding flaw of overinclusion. Regardless of
whatever dialectical tides may have urged this apparent convergence of such opposing approaches, the opinions did create a
sufficiently stable groundwork to support the almost unanimous
backing of the Justices, as well as the enthusiastic support of
the new doctrine by the lower courts.
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion essentially treats the
American criminal jury trial as a historically and politically
unique governmental institution, which by tradition and nature
abhors closure. The first major section of his opinion marshalls
the historical evidence to support the finding that "a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial
under our system of justice.""7 However, the opinion concedes
that the tradition of open trials, by itself, does not establish a
constitutional right to attend such proceedings."' The other
major section of the opinion is therefore directed at establishing
that the historical record reveals an "implicit"0 9 legal recognition of such a right in order to guarantee the specifically enumerated First Amendment rights of speech, press, and assembly. "The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the
long history of trials being presumptively open."2 10 Chief Justice Burger states that "it is not crucial"2" how this right is
labeled, but he refers to it throughout as merely a "right to

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

573.
575.
580.
575.
576.
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attend" 212 criminal trials. His opinion insists that the right is
a "narrow question"21 limited to the spatial contours of a historical "right of visitation" apparently retained by the
people.214
Justice Brennan's opinion also contains two major sections
dealing separately with the history and functional utility of
open trials. But these two sections are preceded by a section of
critical import that reveals the more fundamental basis for the
opinion's declaration that the public enjoys a constitutional
right of access to criminal trials.
Justice Brennan begins by dismissing all prior First Amendment precedents that appear to reject any affirmative right of
access to government information.215 He then points out that
while traditional First Amendment doctrine focuses on shielding
the freedom of communication between speaker and listener,
this is not a necessary limitation on the constitutional reach of
that amendment. For "the First Amendment embodies more
than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in
securing and fostering our republican system of selfgovernment."" 6 Justice Brennan thereby announced the critical new theory of public entitlement guaranteed, by the First
Amendment, that enabled recognition of a public right of access
that transcended the speech-based limitations of earlier First
Amendment doctrine. This passage is certainly the analytical
transition point in Justice Brennan's opinion, yet the legal
authority he presents in support of it is curious. He cites only
three cases, all from the 1930s, and several scholarly works.1 7
212. Id. at 558, 564, 575, 576, 579, 580.
213. Id. at 558.
214. Id. at 572.
215. "These cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public access to
information may at times be implied by the First Amendment and the principles
which animate it." Id. at 586.
216. Id. at 587.
217. Id. The cited cases are the following: United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); and
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). The cited scholarly works are the following: Brennan, supra note 110; ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); THOiAs I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note

192; and Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
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From this primary assertion of the First Amendment's structural role in fulfilling the political goals of the Constitution,
Justice Brennan quickly develops the logic of access. An essential aspect of self-government is public debate, and the "antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well as other
civic behavior-must be informed."2 18 The public, therefore, is
affirmatively entitled to access to government-held information
on matters of public debate, regardless of any connection to
speech-based activity. Having thus established the existence of
a public right of access in the very structural design of the
Constitution, Justice Brennan then acknowledges that "the
stretch of this protection is theoretically endless."219 The theoretical right of access, therefore, must be balanced against "the
opposing interests invaded."22 ° This, then, is the proper and
limited role of the twin factors of history and instrumental
utility. Justice Brennan refers to these factors as "two helpful
principles"2 21 to guide the balancing analysis of access. A historical tradition of openness serves to identify the demonstrated
value of access to certain information, while the utility of access
to a given governmental process serves to establish the corresponding absence of worthy opposing interests of government.
In the succeeding sections of his opinion, Justice Brennan demonstrates, in a manner not entirely dissimilar to that of Chief
Justice Burger, that there is a historical tradition of openness
to criminal jury trials as well as a definite utility of public
access to "the trial process itself."2 22
Although Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan each
resorted to an instrumental analysis to conclude that there was
an implied public right of access to John Paul Stephenson's
trial, the difference in their two approaches is absolutely fundamental to the ultimate scope and legal integrity of the new
doctrine of access. There are three separate ways in which the
openness of a criminal trial may be said to bear some instrumental utility entitled to constitutional protection. First, openness may serve the interests of the specifically enumerated

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

448 U.S. at 587.
Id. at 588 (quoting Brennan, supra note 110, at 177).
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id.
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First Amendment freedoms by fostering better informed speech
and debate. Second, openness may enhance the very performance of the trial process itself. Third, an open trial may serve
the informational needs of a self-governing citizenry that is
ultimately responsible for the public system of justice; here the
goal is not so much informed speech as it is informed suffrage.
These three separate forms of instrumentalism were loosely
combined in the respective opinions of Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers, but they need to be
clearly distinguished.
The first example, that of utility to the textual First Amendment freedoms, is essentially the right-to-gather argument. It
had arguably been rejected quite emphatically in the access
cases described in the previous section.2 3 Indeed, it was Chief
Justice Burger who concluded in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., that
the precoimunicative processes of gathering information, even
when conducted for the express purpose of press publication,
were entitled to no constitutional protection.2" The second
strand of instrumental argument, that of utility to the trial
process itself, had similar difficulties. The Court's Sixth Amend25
ment precedents, most notably Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
essentially established that the administrative function of openness was intended to be safeguarded by an accused's personal
entitlement to a public trial.2 6 In Gannett, the Court stated
that "[i]n an adversary system of criminal justice, the public
interest in the administration of justice is protected by the
participants in the litigation."2 7- Therefore, only the third instrumental argument, that of utility to the structural goal of
creating an informed self-governing electorate, provided an independent and uncompromised basis for recognizing a new public
right of access to trials. 8
The introduction of the "structural" argument was Justice
Brennan's unique and dispositive contribution to the doctrine of

223. See supra text accompanying note 27.
224. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); see also supra text accompanying note 61.
225. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
226. Id. at 383-84.
227. Id. at 383.
228. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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access. Chief Justice Burger limited his opinion to the first two
instrumental arguments, although he did acknowledge the
third.2 29 Structuralism as such has not been a mainstay of the
instrumentalist canon in any field of jurisprudence; it has been
more a concept of political, rather than legal, science. Justice
Brennan apparently appreciated this and therefore asserted
that deriving rights from the structure of the Constitution is no
different from the more accepted practice of implying rights
from the actual text.23 ° Yet the difference is manifest.23 1 The
right to vote is the strongest example of a structurally derived
right cited by Justice Brennan;. 2 however, the early right of
suffrage cases indeed relied upon the explicit textual reference
to an "election" to derive a constitutionally protected right to
vote."'
The essential conflict between the opinions of Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers is apparent. For Chief Justice Burger, history itself provided the essential characteristic of the American jury trial as an utterly
unique public event, while for Justice Brennan, the very political structure of the Constitution was controlling. In stark
terms, Justice Burger's approach to access opens no new doors
to governmental information." 4 His approach ensures only
that access traditionally granted is not lightly denied. In equally stark contrast, Justice Brennan's approach has a "theoretically endless" potential to alter the balance of power over governmental information and it is perhaps the ultimate expression of
his individual First Amendment jurisprudence that had been

229. Id. at 571. Chief Justice Burger stated that open trials had "therapeuti' as
well as "educational" utility. Id.
230. Id. at 588 n.4.
231. See generally Joseph F. Kobylka & David M. Dehnel, Toward a Structuralist
Understanding of First and Sixth Amendment Guarantees, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
363 (1986).
232. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 n.4.
233. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662-65 (1884).
234. This, of course, was consistent with Chief Justice Burger's earlier reservations
about recognizing a constitutional right of access in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S.
1 (1978). "This Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of
access to all sources of information within government control." Id. at 9. Chief Justice
Burger determined that "[tihere is no discernible basis for a constitutional duty to
disclose . . . " Id. at 14. The Court then held that "[nleither the First Amendment
nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information
or sources of information within the government's control." Id. at 15.
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developing over several decades. Justice Brennan's approach
posits a political destiny beyond civil liberty, to which the textual freedoms are but handmaidens. First Amendment freedoms
are explicitly protected in their own right, but not merely "for
their own sakes."23 5 The ultimate goal is that of a self-governing democracy. Information itself is essential to the individual
autonomy of a self-governing electorate; therefore, information
itself is a positive democratic liberty interest affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution.2 36
The underlying conflict between the two different approaches
to access surfaced in the Court's next access case, decided two
years after Richmond Newspapers. This time, Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Brennan found themselves at opposite ends
of the holding. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court23 7 involved the closure of a Massachusetts trial of a defendant
charged with the rape of three minor victims. A state statute
required that the trial be closed during the testimony of the
three teenage women.23 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reviewed the constitutionality of the statute in light of
Richmond Newspapers and upheld the statute because trials for
sexual assault were "one notable exception" to the historical
tradition of open trials.3 9 History was the deciding factor for
the state court. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
finding the mandatory closure statute unconstitutional on its
face." Although the facts in Globe were harder than those of
Richmond Newspapers, the case produced the first majority
opinion on the new right of access. Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, once again relied upon the structural theory of representative self-government.2 4 ' Chief Justice Burger wrote a

235. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587.
236. See id. at 587-88 n.3.
237. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
238. The trial court had interpreted the statute to require closure of the entire
trial, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that only the actual
testimony of the minor witnesses had to be closed. Id. at 599-600.
239. Id. at 601 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 423 N.E.2d 773,

778 (1981)).
240. 457 U.S. at 602. The Court held that the mandatory closure rule violated the
First Amendment. Id.
241. Id. at 606. According to Justice Brennan, "in the broadest terms, public access
to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the
judicial process-an essential component in our structure of self-government." Id.
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vigorous dissent, reaffirming his principal reliance upon the
factor of historical practice.242 Justice Brennan's opinion in
Globe, therefore, has become the operative authority for the
lower courts and the reason why the history prong of the new
access doctrine has so quickly faded from prominence.
B. Justice Brennan: The Critical Contribution
To comprehend fully the new First Amendment doctrine of
access, it is essential to enlarge our understanding of the new
structural theory advanced by Justice Brennan, adopted by a
majority of the Court, and now significantly extended by the
lower courts.
What was novel about Justice Brennan's opinion in Richmond Newspapers was not that it appeared to rely upon on
essentially political, rather than textual, interpretation of the
First Amendment. This corner of constitutional interpretation
had long since been turned. Yet, to be sure, the original understanding of the reach of the First Amendment had been avowedly non-political. The original understanding was that the
amendment protected no more than the common law doctrine of
free speech.24 The common law protection was limited to freedom from prior restraint.' Beginning in the 1930s with some
of the cases cited by Justice Brennan, the Court had progressively, if haltingly, expanded First Amendment guarantees by
resort to an increasingly political interpretation of the First

(footnote omitted).
242. See id. at 612-20.
243. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) ("The law is perfectly well
settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the
Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but
simply to embody certain guarantees and immunities which we had inherited from
our English ancestors.").
244. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931):
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before
the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he
publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the
consequence of his own temerity.
Id. at 713 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151, 152) (emphasis added).
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Amendment as a revolutionary document intended to protect
more than the common law.245
Stromberg v. California,"8 the lead case cited by Justice
Brennan as authority for his structural theory in Richmond
Newspapers, is a fitting example. The Stromberg case involved
a California statute prohibiting virtually any public display of a
red flag "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized
government...

,,7

The Supreme Court struck down the stat-

ute without resorting to prior-restraint or clear-and-presentdanger analysis. Instead, the statute was held unconstitutional
per se because it prohibited speech on the basis of its seditious
content alone."' This censoring of political debate was viewed
as inconsistent with the political purpose of the First Amendment. 9 Chief Justice Hughes advanced the then-novel view
that the freedom of political opposition was itself a political
goal of the Constitution and therefore intended to be protected
by the First Amendment. According to Chief Justice Hughes,
"[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitu-

tional system."25 Assertions such as this increasingly began to
characterize the Court's more affirmative, expansive interpretation of the First Amendment as a constitutional check on
governmental power. Seditious comment, the speech hardly

245. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
Ratified as it was while the memory of many oppressive English restrictions on the enumerated liberties was still fresh, the First Amendment
cannot reasonably be taken as approving prevalent English practices. On
the contrary, the only conclusion supported by history is that the unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to give to
liberty of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope that
could be countenanced in an orderly society.
Id. at 265. Since cases like Near and Bridges, "[o]ne can hardly imagine a tradition
of reasoning about the meaning of the first amendment that did not depend heavily
on postulates deriving from democratic theory." Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the
Self.Government Theory of the FirstAmendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61
U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 36 (1990).
246. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
247. Id. at 361 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 403(a) (repealed 1933)).
248. Id. at 369-70.
249. Id. at 369.
250. Id. This passage was also cited by Justice Brennan in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
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protected at common law, became the speech that represented
the "core purpose" of the guarantees of the First Amendment.
Thus, by 1966, the Court was able to refer to the "practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."2 5 '
However, until Richmond Newspapers, the Court had refused
to cross a certain line with respect to its increasingly affirmative, political interpretation of the First Amendment. The paradigm of protection of free speech, even "political speech," remained that of the shield. The Court required government to
respect it, but not necessarily to promote it. Freedom of individual expression was increasingly protected against interference
or inhibition by the state. The political branches were increasingly required to maintain a laissez-faire posture towards an
ever-expanding marketplace of private information. The Court,
however, had consistently refused, particularly in the prison
access cases, 25 2 to exceed this libertarian paradigm. The Court
had not affirmatively required government to intervene in,
regulate, promote, privilege, expand, or subsidize the market of
private communication.
The structural theory employed by Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers was more than just another milestone in the
political or instrumental analysis of the First Amendment.
Even for Justice Brennan did not, in the end, rely upon the
libertarian guarantees of free speech or press to fashion a right
of access. Instead, he identified a political right of sovereignty
or self-government that was both beyond and indhpendent of
the individual liberty of speech.25 This right was a political
liberty implied not by the Constitution's textual guarantees, but
rather by the political structure of the Constitution in general

251. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). One of those who adamantly opposed this universal agreement was Justice Frankfurter, who said that "[t]he historic
antecedents of the First Amendment preclude the notion that its purpose was to give
unqualified immunity to every expression that touched on matters within the range of
political interest." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 521 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
in affirmance).
252. See supra text accompanying note 52.
253. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 551, 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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and the First Amendment in particular." Consequently, Richmond Newspapers does not vindicate a freedom of speech so
much as it does a freedom of self-rule. Self-rule is an entitlement that belongs to all citizens in their sovereign capacity,
regardless of any act of speech or publication on their part. It
was therefore a right not necessarily limited by, or even closely
related to, prior interpretations of the parameters of the textual
guarantees.
Justice Brennan's structural theory was novel, even radical,
but it was also flawed. It was an adaptation of earlier workings
on a structural theory that did not entirely fit the situation of a
courtroom right of access. Most significantly, the theory appeared to be premised on a theory of representative democracy
that had little or no bearing on a right of public access to the
non-representative branch of the Judiciary. Yet Justice
Brennan's structural theory has indeed provided the essential
legal bases for the breakthrough development of the Richmond
Newspapers doctrine. It is therefore a theory that merits a more
exacting scrutiny than it has yet received in the case law or the
legal literature.
1. The Underlying Contribution: Alexander Meiklejohn
The seminal figure in the modern development of the political
theory of the First Amendment is Alexander Meiklejohn." 5
For someone of such undisputed influence on the First Amendment, Meiklejohn is also an unlikely figure. He did not believe
in the philosophy of individual rights independent of govern-

254. Id. at 587-88.
255. See BeVier, supra note 20, at 503 ('[Meiklejohn's] insights into the relevance
of self-government to First Amendment analysis have been of seminal importance.");
Ronald A. Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV.
1287, 1311 n.147 (1979) (Meiklejohn "gave this principle [of political speech] its first
general theoretical expression."); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Rightto-Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4 ("It has been suggested that the right-to-know be
adopted as the sole, or at least the principal, basis for the constitutional protection
afforded by the First Amendment. Alexander Meiklejohn is the primary source of this
theory."); Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of
Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1993) ("The most influential exposition of the collectivist theory of the First Amendment is by the American philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn; his work continues to inspire and guide the theory's contemporary advocates.") (footnote omitted).
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ment;256 he disdained "licentious individualism;"257 he abhorred Locke; 25" his mentor and model was Rousseau.25 9 Like
Rousseau, Meiklejohn's influence was more in the spirit than in
the letter of his works. 2 0 His central contribution to First

Amendment theory was a reassertion of the classical values of
republican self-government. This premise of a constitutional
commitment to self-government has become the central fixture
in the "standard rationale for a first amendment right of access
to government information ..

.""' It is therefore necessary, in

order to capture the central significance of the new doctrine of
access, to trace this doctrine to its source.
Alexander Meiklejohn was a progressive educator and teacher
of philosophy. Prior to World War I, he served as Dean of
Brown University and then President of Amherst College. During the progressive era between the world wars, he directed
several experimental colleges and wrote extensively on education and its critical relation to the American experience. By
1938, he had effectively retired as an active educator and begun
his work on a general theory of education. When his final,
highly visionary theory was published in 1942,262 he was al-

ready seventy years old and had not yet taken up his principal
involvement with the freedom of expression. But the
antisubversive campaigns of that period, which he perceived as
a galling attack on intellectual freedom, led him into a second
and more distinguished career as a constitutional theorist.
When he died in 1964 at the age of ninety-two, he was widely

256.

See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, EDUCATION BETWEEN TWO WORLDS 80 (1942).

257. Id. at 82.
258. See id. at 26-35.
259. See generally id. at 71, 210 (stating that we should "take our view" from
Rousseau).
260. Meiklejohn was keenly aware of the irony of Rousseau's influence and appears
to have cast himself in a like mold. According to Meiklejohn:
This is the sort of mind which is needed as a disintegrating culture is
torn to shreds, and preparation is made for the forming of a new culture
to take its place. It is easy to disagree with Rousseau. He is essentially
a transitional, a preparatory thinker. Few men of sober mind would be
inclined to accept his theories as he frames them. And yet he cannot be
ignored.
Id. at 71-72.

261. BeVier, supra note 6, at 314.
262. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 256.
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revered as a "militant champion of freedom" for his provocative

views on the First Amendment.

3

Meiklejohn was not a lawyer. He neither wrote nor argued in
the legal idiom.214 His constitutional theory was, in many respects, as idealistic and as visionary as his educational theory.
Yet, Meiklejohn disdained the view that his lack of legal training represented any compromise or disqualification of his constitutional arguments. 265 Noting the absence in the historical record of any evidence of original intent to support his constitutional views, Meiklejohn graciously excused the founders for
being too preoccupied with a revolution in progress to clearly
express their views. "In that sense, the Framers did not know
what they were doing."266 Yet as a champion of intellectual
freedom who espoused an heroic role for the Supreme Court in
the safeguarding of American democracy, 27 his views enjoyed
an innate, resonant appeal that appeared to transcend the
palpable limitations of his legal scholarship.
As a constitutional advocate, Meiklejohn was also very much
a product of his times. The early formulations of Cold War

263. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1965).
264. Meiklejohn made no real attempt to support his constitutional theories with
traditional legal authority. There was, in fact, much legal theory that he passed over.
Most notably, Meiklejohn failed to seize upon then-district court Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd,
246 F. 24 (2d Cir.), in which Judge Hand dismissed one of the first prosecutions
under the Espionage Act of 1917. Justice Holmes later rejected Judge Hand's approach in favor of his own clear-and-present danger test. See Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). "But Meiklejohn did not notice that Judge Hand's
Masses opinion was based on the self-government theory." Blasi, supra note 246, at
14.
265. Meiklejohn was never at a loss to respond to his lawyer friends who suggested that his views might not hold up to lawyerly scrutiny. When Justice Frankfin-ter
suggested that Meiklejohn's theories would be much improved by spending three
years at a good law school, Meiklejohn responded that he would be happy to do so, if
only the Justice would spend the same three years at a good school of philosophy.
And when his friend Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. made a similar suggestion,
Meiklejohn, at the age of 88, produced his most often-cited law review article, The
First Amendment is an Absolute. CYNTHIA S. BROWN, ALEXANDER MEJKLEJOHN:
TEACHER OF FREEDOM 46-47, 246 (1981).
266. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 264.
267. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 32 (1965) [hereinafter POLITICAL FREEDOM].
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ideology were then raging in the form of a congressional assault
on all subversive political thought. Ideas, not merely speech,
were at issue. In the Supreme Court, this tension was expressed in the form of a protracted debate over whether the
First Amendment provided "absolute" protection against such
legislative abridgement.2 68 Meiklejohn's constitutional theory
had one immediate concern: to disempower government, but
particularly Congress, from interfering with the intellectual
freedom of its sovereign people. Meiklejohn expressed little
patience with non-absolute legal formulations like the clear-andpresent-danger test to accomplish this goal in an era when
"[wle are69 officially engaged in the suppression of 'dangerous'
2
speech.
As might be expected, Meiklejohn's constitutional theory
began with his educational theory. His view of the state was
classically idealistic and borrowed generously from Rousseau's
General Will. ° Individuals did not secure or compromise natural rights in the social compact; instead they gained the only
rights that they had: "On the contrary, the state is the best of
us, trying to control and to elevate the worst of us. It is ourselves seeking to be reasonable, to live in justice and freedom
with one another."2 71 In Education Between Two Worlds,272
his major theoretical work, Meiklejohn posits a world of warring nation-states on its way to becoming a single "World-state."
Public education's purpose is to prepare people for their most
vital role as self-governing citizens in the democratic worldstate. "Every human being, young or old, should be taught, first
of all, to be a citizen of the world, a member of the human fellowship. All other lessons are derivatives of that primary lesson."273 For Meiklejohn, as for Rousseau, individuals could at-

268. The principal proponent of the absolutist view during this period was Justice

Black. See Hugo L. Black, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960).
269.
270.
271.
272.

MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 267, at 107.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 256, at 84.
Id.
The title is taken from a poem by Matthew Arnold, "The Grand Chartreuse":
Wandering between two worlds, one dead,
The other powerless to be born,
With nowhere yet to rest my head,
Like these, on earth I wait forlorn.
Id. at 48.
273. Id. at 286.
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tain freedom only through their educated participation in a selfgoverning republic. Thus, the state had an affirmative obligation to educate and prepare all citizens for their role as sovereign. "To be free does not mean to be well governed. It does not
mean to be justly governed. It means to be self-governed."274
True liberty was therefore not an individual but rather a collective condition of enlightened self-sovereignty.
The constitutional interpretation that emerged from this
democratic theory was straightforward. The primary and overriding purpose of our revolutionary Constitution was to create a
self-governing republic. Everything else was derived from and
informed by this central premise. Each individual passage, as
well as the overall structure of the Constitution, revealed and
confirmed this revolutionary intent. Self-government was the
touchstone of all constitutional analysis, specifically including
the central meaning of the First Amendment. "The principle of
the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason
in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal
suffrage."275
The actual establishment of a representative democracy did
little to temper Meiklejohn's premise of a direct, self-governing
democracy. He found the operative paradigm for American democracy in the "traditional American town meeting."276 The

genius of the Constitution was that the sovereign power of the
people was neither ceded nor delegated to the political representatives. This was what separated the American experiment
from parliamentary democracy. By virtue of the structure of the
Constitution, the people remained the "First Branch" of government.277 The three created branches were inferior, or "subordinate," agencies of government.27 8 This "master-servant" rela-

274. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 267, at 98.
275. Id. at 27.
276. Id. at 24-26.
277. Testimony on the Meaning of the First Amendment Before the Hennings Senate
Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Nov. 14, 1955) (testimony of Alexander Meiklejohn) in MEIKLEFJOHN, supra
note 267, at 116.
278. MEHKLEOHN, supra note 267, at 99.
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tionship was essential to the success of the constitutional

experiment.2 79 The freedom of thought and expression was
essential to the informed exercise and maintenance of an operative popular sovereignty. "The revolutionary intent of the First
Amendment is, then, to deny to all subordinate agencies
authority to abridge the freedom of the electoral power of the
people."2 °
For the perennial dilemmas of what speech is protected and
to what degree, Meiklejohn proposed a structural solution. He
posited "two radically different kinds of utterances,"2 1 one
guaranteed by the First Amendment and one guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment. Each type of utterance received a different
degree of protection. The first type was a general category of
speech which was a liberty regulated by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.5 2 This category included all
speech conducted in a private or individual capacity unrelated
to the exercise of sovereignty. The government could abridge
this speech as it could any other liberty interest, subject to the
standards of due process. The other category of speech involved
the citizen's power to speak in a sovereign capacity. This was
the only speech protected by the First Amendment and it was
protected absolutely. Certainly, this speech was unabridgable by
any subordinate power, such as Congress. "The guarantee given
by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to all speaking.
It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly,
upon issues with which voters have to deal-only, therefore, to
the consideration of matters of public interest."2 3 Lawyers, of
course, would insist that the devil was in the details of such an
assertion, but Meiklejohn was not inclined to further define or
delineate these two categories of speech. He was satisfied to
provide a structural solution which essentially severed the First
Amendment from traditional libertarian doctrine and interposed
new and absolute citizen powers over government.

279. Id. at 72.
280. Id. at 248; see id. at 115-16.
281. Id. at 37.
282. This Fifth Amendment protection was consistent with the doctrine stated in
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Gitlow stated that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protected speech as a fundamental liberty. Id. at 666.
283. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 267, at 79.
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It is at this point in Meiklejohn's theory that the implications
for access to government information become manifest. Although Meiklejohn did not directly address rights of access to
government information, his principles of self-governing democracy have proven seminal to the development of such putative
rights. For if one accepts the premise that the people have an
affirmative obligation to exercise their sovereign will upon government, it follows perforce that government has an affirmative
obligation to disclose. "The primary purpose of the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as possible,
understand the issues which bear upon our common life. That
is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counter-belief, no relevant information, may be kept from them."2
Without question, then, Meiklejohn's basic understanding of
the First Amendment was less than traditional. Indeed, his
structural theory was, in many ways, so eccentric as to make
curious his undeniable influence on a broad spectrum of more
conventional jurists285 and scholars. 8 6 However radical he
was as a democrat, Meiklejohn was certainly no radical libertarian. He did not believe in individual rights, nor did he concern himself with the personal values of individual autonomy or
self-fulfillment. 7 He did not believe that liberty was inherently threatened by governmental action, but rather that liberty
required an active, affirmative role for government. Indeed, on
the very first occasion that Meiklejohn was cited in a Supreme
Court opinion, he was employed for ironic contrast in a dissent
by Justice Jackson "But even he," intoned the Justice, "does not
support unlimited speech."2"
And, indeed, Meiklejohn did not. The speech that was entitled to the absolute protection of the First Amendment was, for

284. Id. at 75.
285. Since 1951, Meiklejohn has been cited by the Supreme Court on 23 separate
occasions by 11 different Justices. See generally Edward J. Bloustein, The First
Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher,28 RUTGERS
L. REv. 41 (1975).
286. Meildejohn has influenced legal scholars as disparately located as Thomas
Emerson and Robert Bork. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 217, at 26-27; Emerson, supra
note 255, at 4-5.
287. For these reasons, Professor Emerson found Meiklejohn's general theory of the
First Amendment inadequate. Emerson, supra note 255, at 4.
288. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 300 n.3 (1951).
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Meiklejohn, a serious matter. First Amendment free speech had
nothing to do with "unregulated talkativeness."289 Free speech
mattered only to the extent that the contents of that speech be
heard.
[T]he First Amendment is not, in the first instance, concerned with the "right" of the speaker to say this or that. It
is concerned with the authority of the hearers to meet together, to discuss, and to hear discussed by speakers of
their own choice, whatever they may deem worthy of their
consideration."
Meiklejohn was more concerned with the corporate body's right
to hear than the individual's right to speak. He regarded a
philosophy of individual or prior rights as pernicious and made
bitter attacks on prevailing First Amendment doctrine, particularly that of Justice Holmes.29' Meiklejohn considered
Holmes' development of the clear-and-present-danger test in
Schenck v. United States292 as the signal failure of First
Amendment jurisprudence: "That ruling annuls the most significant purpose of the First Amendment. It destroys the intellectual basis of our plan of self-government."293 Certainly,
Meiklejohn's constitutional theory was not grounded in the
libertarian concept of self-expression. His contribution to First
Amendment doctrine, and in particular to right-to-know theory,
was made not in terms of an enhanced understanding of informed speech, but rather in a renewed appreciation of informed suffrage.
The apparent dissonance of Meiklejohn's structural theory of
the Constitution with traditional First Amendment doctrine was
overcome by his reassertion of the classical values of republican
self-government.294 His insistence that citizens could not be
treated as subjects and that the political views of government,
and not those of the people, were subject to restriction struck a

289.
290.
291.
at 61.
292.
293.
294.

MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 267, at 26.
Id. at 119.
"The philosophy of Mr. Holmes was .

.

. one of excessive individualism." Id.

249 U.S. 47 (1919).
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 267, at 30.
See sources cited infra note 386 (discussing the new republican revival).
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responsive chord with a First Amendment struggling to resolve
its authority over government abridgement of subversive beliefs295 and seditious libel." 6 Prior to Richmond Newspapers,
Meiklejohn had been cited in twenty-two Supreme Court opinions by ten different justices. Indeed, even Chief Justice
Burger's opinion in Richmond Newspapers, which did not cite
him directly, appears to bear some markings of Meiklejohn.297
He is also routinely cited in the legal literature discussing
structural theory 98 or self-government. 9 There is little
question, however, that the writings of Meiklejohn found their
ultimate voice in law through the opinions of Justice
Brennan."'
Justice Brennan has readily acknowledged the influence of
Meiklejohn on his First Amendment opinions. Several months
after Meiklejohn's death in 1964, Justice Brennan delivered an
address in his honor.30 ' He traced the evolving approaches of
the Supreme Court to First Amendment issues and referred to
Meiklejohn as one of those who advocated an "absolutist" view
of the Amendment which had "not yet""0 2 become the majority
view of the Court. Justice Brennan then described the Court's
recent majority opinion in the landmark case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,"'3 written by Justice Brennan, as a possible point of departure for the Court. He suggested that the
opinion represented a "departure from" earlier approaches and
"the adoption, not of Mr. Justice Black's 'absolute' reading of

295. See, e.g., Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405, 408 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 340 (1957) (Black, J., concurring & dissenting).
296. Meiklejohn was a major influence on the Court's opinion in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV.
191.
297. With respect to one passage in the opinion, one commentator has noted: "The
words could have been Meiklejohn's." Lewis, supra note 111, at 16.
298. See, e.g., Kobylka & Dehnel, supra note 231.
299. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 245.
300. "Recently, the views of Professor Alexander Meiklejohn have seemed to play
an extremely important role in determining the dramatic turn in Supreme Court free
expression theory, signaled by the New York Times case." Bloustein, supra note 285,
at 72 (footnote omitted).
301. Brennan, supra note 263.
302. Id. at 4.
303. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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the first amendment, but of a reading in substantial agreement
with that which Dr. Meiklejohn has urged.""0 4 Justice
Brennan asserted that the Sullivan court had reexamined the
"central meaning" of the First Amendment and found that it
resided in the maintenance of the sovereign power of the people
over their agents of government." 5
Justice Brennan also pointed out that his opinion in Sullivan
bears an even more direct debt to Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn had
supported his absolutist view of the First Amendment by referring to the absolute constitutional immunity provided for House
debate by members of Congress." 6 Meiklejohn reasoned that
since these subordinate agents were given absolute protection
for their political speech, surely the sovereign people were entitled to no less protection on the same grounds.0 7 Justice
Brennan used a variation of this same analogy in Sullivan to
conclude that the people were privileged to criticize, even libel,
their subordinate political officials. 8' Justice Brennan cited
the earlier case of Barr v. Matteo, °9 which held that executive
officials were absolutely privileged against libel suits,"0 and
concluded that "[ainalogous considerations support the privilege
for the citizen-critic of government." 1 ' This argument is vintage Meiklejohn. One astute commentator concluded: "At this
point in its rhetoric and sweep, the opinion almost literally
incorporated Alexander Meiklejohn's thesis that in a democracy,
the citizen as ruler is our most important public official."1 2
Later that same term, in a case that extended the Sullivan test
to the defamation of sitting judges, Justice Brennan once again
closely paraphrased Meiklejohn: "For speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self3 13
government."

304. Brennan, supra note 263, at 10.
305. Id. at 15.
306. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
307. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 267, at 249.
308. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
309. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
310. Id. at 574.
311. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282.
312. Kalven, supra note 296, at 209.
313. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Justice Brennan has acknowledged Meiklejohn as the source of this paraphrase: "Doubtless some of you may
think that [this] sentence of the opinion . . . echoes Dr. Meiklejohn's statement. ..."
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In his First Amendment opinions prior to Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan relied upon Meiklejohn to the same ends
as other Justices in extending the protection afforded speech.
The principle of self-government was employed to support the
argument that "political speech" was at the core of the First
Amendment and therefore entitled to enhanced constitutional
protection. However, after the bitter battle over courtroom access in Gannett Newspapers, Justice Brennan returned to
Meiklejohn for something quite different.
In an address Justice Brennan delivered several months after
the decision in Gannett Newspapers, he posited "two distinct
models" for First Amendment analysis.314 The first of these
models was the "speech model." This was the traditional libertarian approach which Justice Brennan described "as comfortable as a pair of old shoes."315 But these old shoes had apparently done most of their walking without arriving at the ultimate destination of the First Amendment. For "[tihe 'speech'
model," according to Justice Brennan, "has its limitations."316
Justice Brennan did not spell out those limitations, but he was
certainly writing within the context of a discussion of the
Court's recent rulings adverse to access. To extend the reach of
the First Amendment beyond the traditional protection of the
speech model, Justice Brennan posited another approach, which
he referred to as the "structural model."" 7 This model was
premised on the Constitution's structural guarantee of self-government: "The Amendment... forbids the government from
interfering with the communicative processes through which we
citizens exercise and prepare to exercise our rights of self-government.... Another way of saying this is that the First
Amendment protects the structure of communications necessary
for the existence of our democracy."318 This address was Justice Brennan's first attempt at a theory of an affirmative governmental obligation to maintain the structure of communications contemplated by the Constitution.1 9 There was no
Brennan, supra note 263, at 18.
314. Brennan, supra note 110, at 175.
315. Id. at 176.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Justice Brennan had earlier made note of the critical connection between a
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mistaking Justice Brennan's appreciation of the novelty and
significance of the structural approach. "It significantly extends
the umbrella of the press' constitutional protections. The press
is not only shielded when it speaks out, but when it performs
all the myriad tasks necessary for it to gather and disseminate
the news."3 2 ° Indeed, because the affirmative reach of this approach was "theoretically endless,"3 21 structurally-derived
rights could not be afforded the near absolute protection of
textually-derived rights. Structural rights required balancing.
Justice Brennan limited this initial description of his structural theory of the First Amendment to the institutional press
(although not to the Press Clause). Although his analysis borrowed heavily from Meiklejohn's theory of affirmative structural
guarantees, Justice Brennan limited his analytical model to the
"structure of communications" guaranteed by the Constitution
rather than to the structure of the Constitution itself. Thus,
Justice Brennan's initial analysis was essentially a structural
theory of press privilege. The Supreme Court had, of course,
consistently denied such a privilege during the 1970s. 2
Justice Brennan's initial theory of a press privilege, however,
was not the structural theory that evolved several months later
into his opinion in Richmond Newspapers. In that opinion,
Justice Brennan reworked his structural analysis. He created
an affirmative right of public as well as press access to governmental institutions, based upon the public's inherent right to
information necessary for self-governance. The structural model
was refashioned, but, the central import remained the same.

free press and a responsible Judiciary:
Commentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the core
of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the administration of
government. Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the competence and impartiality
of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute
to public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the
functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as well as improve the
quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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The constitutional imperative of self-government created an
affirmative public right, which required the government to provide access to the information necessary for an informed exercise of sovereignty.
The Supreme Court decided the Sullivan case only months
before Alexander Meiklejohn died. Meiklejohn reviewed the
opinion and did not fail to appreciate the political analysis underlying Justice Brennan's opinion. In a conversation with a
friend concerning his reaction to the opinion, Meiklejohn proclaimed, "It is an occasion for dancing in the streets." 2 3 He, of
course, did not live to witness the Court's decision in Richmond
Newspapers, but his reaction may be assumed: the dancing was
to continue and it had moved into the courthouse.
IV. A REVISED RIGHT OF ACCESS
It is necessary to revise both our understanding and our
appreciation of the right of access recognized in Richmond
Newspapers. The right should be restated to center upon the
governmental decision-making power of the Judiciary, rather
than the functional utility of access to a given judicial process.
This restatement of the right would recognize a constitutional
right of access to the Judiciary analogous, in principle and
practice, to the statutory rights of access applicable to the Executive Branch. It is a revision fully supported by broader doctrinal developments that articulate and espouse a modern view
of the Judiciary. In First Amendment terms, at least three
separate factors call for such a revision: (1) the revision better
conforms the right to the underlying structural theory adopted
by the Court; (2) the revision creates a more definitive rule of
access for the courts; and (3) the revision facilitates the principled, and seemingly inexorable, expansion of the new doctrine
of access.
The central task of this section is to defend the following
proposed restatement of the Richmond Newspapers doctrine:
The public has a right of access to all information, located
within the adjudicative process, relevant to an evaluation of
323. Kalven, supra note 296, at 221 n.125.
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the exercise or performance of judicial authority over substantive matters of official court business, unless there is a
sufficiently compelling reason not to so provide access.
The doctrinal revision accomplished by this proposal transforms
the Richmond Newspapers right from an instrumental right to
observe proceedings or documents to a systemic right to obtain
information relevant to a public review of all official judicial
transactions.
The structural theory of the First Amendment adopted in
Richmond Newspapers does not strictly support a right of access centered upon the functional utility of access to an instrument of court-based information. The theory proves both too
much and too little for the determination of such a right. The
underlying theory does, however, support a right construed in
terms of an affirmative public right of access to information
related to the exercise of judicial power over cases and controversies submitted to the courts for resolution.
A. The Broader Doctrinal Context
It is necessary to underscore the limited ambitions of the
argument in this Part. What follows is not intended to be a
defense of the structural theory of the Constitution or even of
the Court's modified adoption of it in the Richmond Newspapers
line of cases. No such effort occurs here despite the fact that
these matters are logically antecedent to a defense of the doctrine that relies upon the theory. Rather, this article assumes
the qualified adoption of the structural theory, as described
above, and argues instead for a revision of the doctrine to better fulfill and conform with the theory. Yet, it may still prove
useful to the purposes of this article to articulate more precisely the broader doctrinal context that supports the foregoing
assumption.
The central proposition of the newly adopted structural theory is that the Judiciary is itself a governing instrumentality,
and that judges exercise sovereign political power through their
binding juridic acts. This central premise is indeed controversial. The extent to which the Judiciary is a proactive agency of
government, as well as the extent to which it may be deemed a
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"representative" institution of government, continues to be a
well-contested proposition in the judicial review literature, particularly in the ambitious reconstructions of the "republican
revival" theorists.32 4
Traditionally, the Third Branch has been viewed as decidedly
non-representative,3 2 5 non-governmental3 2 6 and nonpolitical. 7 This view is central to much of the contemporary
theory of judicial review." The essential logic of this position
is that the legitimacy of judicial review is premised on the
capacity for judicial neutrality, which in turn is premised on
the courts' capacity for political indifference. More broadly, the
extended logic of this requirement of an apolitical Judiciary
suggests that critical discourse concerning the operation of the
courts inherently threatens the judicial impartiality upon which
all freedoms depend.2 9 Indeed, this somewhat hallowed view
of judicial neutrality was central to the traditional authority of
courts to punish a mere "contempt by publication."3 '
But in the modern era, this line has not held. During the
same period that the Court was developing the doctrine of "political speech" as central to the First Amendment,3 ' the Court

324. See infra text accompanying note 386.
325. See e.g., Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964) ("Manifestly, judges and prosecutors are not representatives in the same sense as are legislatars or the executive. Their function is to administer the law, not to espouse the
cause of a particular constituency."); Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865
(N.D. Ohio 1960) ("Judges do not represent people, they serve people.").
326. See e.g., Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972), affd mem.,
409 U.S. 1095 (1973) ("[Tlhe rationale behind the one man-one vote principle, which
evolved out of efforts to preserve a truly representative form of government, is simply
not relevant to the makeup of the Judiciary.").
327. See e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements,
914 F.2d 620, 631 (5th Cir. 1990), reo'd sub. noma. Houston Lawyers Ass'n v. Attorney
Gen., 501 U.S. 2376 (1991) ("Judicial offices and judicial selection processes are sui
generis in our nation's political system; they determine the referees in our
majoritarian political game.").
328. See infra text accompanying note 383.
329. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The administration of justice by an impartial Judiciary has been basic to
our conception of freedom ever since Magna Carta.").
330. See id. This common law doctrine held that courts had the inherent power to
shield themselves from outside influence by punishing as contempt any extrajudicial
publication concerning a pending case that tended to influence the proceedings.
331. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (Free speech doctrine now
relies upon the "practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First]
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also reviewed the premise that speech about the Judiciary was
3 32
not so included. The seminal case is Bridges v. California.
A California trial court used its contempt powers to punish
newspapers for publishing information concerning matters pending before the court. The Supreme Court of California upheld
the contempt findings on the traditional premise that "[1]iberty
of the press is subordinate to the independence of the Judiciary .... ,3. The Supreme Court held, over the forceful dissent
of Justice Frankfurter, that comment upon matters pending
before the Judiciary was in fact central to the mandate of the
First Amendment. "It is therefore the controversies that command most interest that the decisions below would remove from
3 4 Bridges was soon followed
the arena of public discussion.""
by several closely related contempt cases."' These cases firmly established that "[t]here is no special perquisite of the Judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions
of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events
which transpire in proceedings before it." '36
The political realism of Bridges has also influenced the development of the modern view of the Judiciary in contexts outside
of the First Amendment. Central to the modern view is the
notion that the Judiciary, as a coordinate institution of government, is not politically neutral and, therefore, must be held
politically accountable for its own exercise of governmental
power." 7 The clash, as well as the evolution, of the traditional
and modern views of the least dangerous branch is most evident in the apportionment cases. In the early cases, the tradi-

Amendment was to protect the free discussion of government affairs.").
332. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
333. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 98 P.2d 1029, 1040 (Cal. 1940) (quoting
In re Indep. Publishing Co., 240 F. 849, 862 (9th Cir. 1917).
334. 314 U.S. at 269.
335. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
336. Id. at 374.
337. Even Justice Frankfurter, who dissented fervently in Bridges, was keenly sensitive to the need to accompany judicial power with sunshine. As Justice Frankfurter
stated:
Of course freedom of speech and of the press are essential to the enlightenment of a free people and in restraining those who wield power. Particularly should this freedom be employed in comment upon the work of
courts, who are without many influences ordinarily making for humor
and humility, twin antidotes to the corrosion of power.
Bridges, 314 U.S. at 284.
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tional view prevailed to the effect that judicial elections were
treated as an exception to the one person-one vote principle.
This occurred because the Judiciary was not "representative" in
nature, and the equal protection rationale of the apportionment
cases was "simply not relevant to the makeup of the Judiciary."33 8 The Supreme Court adopted this position by way of
33 9 Yet even in
summary affirmance in Wells v. Edwards.
Wells, Justice White's dissent offered the following premonition
of what has become the prevailing -view: "Judges are not private
citizens who are sought out by litigious neighbors to pass upon
their disputes. They are state officials, vested with state powers
and elected (or appointed) to carry out the state government's
judicial functions. As such, they most certainly 'perform governmental functions."' 30
Most recently, this modern view has prevailed in limited
respects in two separate areas of statutory interpretation. These
areas include voter apportionment and age discrimination statutes as applied to the Judiciary. Chisom v. Roemer341 and
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General 2 were apportionment cases involving the Federal Voting Rights Act. Both cases
addressed the issue of whether the statutory law of apportionment applied to judicial elections. In each case, the Fifth Circuit relied upon Wells to hold that a section of the Act covering
elections of "representatives" did not apply to judicial elections.
The Fifth Circuit stated that "the Judiciary serves no representative function whatever: the judge represents no one."33 The
Supreme Court reversed both cases. While the Court limited
the majority opinion in Chisom to an analysis of the statutory
terms in question, the Court did find occasion to reject the traditional view relied upon by the circuit court: "The fundamental
tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and
the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by cred-

338. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972), affd mem., 409
U.S. 1095 (1973).
339. Id.

340. 409 U.S. at 1096-97.
341. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
342. 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
343. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 (LULAC) v. Clements,
914 F.2d 620, 625-26 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub. nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
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iting judges with total indifference to the popular will while
simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office."'
The issue in Gregory v. Ashcroft3" was whether state court
judges were government employees "at a policymaking level"
and therefore not protected by the federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967.3" The Supreme Court held that
they were. Justice O'Connor noted in her opinion for the Court
that the issue of a state's power to select its judges and to limit
their terms implicated the following concerns: "The authority of
the people of the States to determine the qualifications of their
most important government officials;"3" "the unique nature of
state decisions that 'go to the heart of representative democracy;' 348 and a concern for 'judges' general lack of accountability." 49 The opinion therefore concluded that the manifest differences between judicial and other governmental officials were
mooted by the common characteristic of public governance: "It
may be sufficient that the appointee is in a position requiring
the exercise of discretion concerning issues of public importance.
This certainly describes the bench, regardless of whether judges
might be considered policymakers in the same sense as the
35
executive or legislature."
Therefore, while it cannot be said that the Court has definitively revised its self-conception as a political institution, the
critical political characterization of the Judicial Branch expressed in Richmond Newspapers is not out of context with
respect to the Court's modern view of the Judiciary. The real
aim of the present article, in any event, is not to join issue
with any of the broader debates over the proper institutional
characterization of the Judiciary. For instance, we will visit the
republican-revival literature only to identify the remarkable,
and apparently unappreciated, coincidence between the new
right of access and the republican call for the development of

344. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400-01.
345. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
346. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621634 (1993)).
347. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463.
348. Id. at 461 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
349. Id. at 472.
350. Id. at 466-67.
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affirmative liberties not countenanced by the traditional liberalpluralist reading of the Constitution. Therefore, this part will
not attempt to demonstrate the essentially political or representative character of the Judiciary. Rather, the starting point here
is that the Supreme Court, in the Richmond Newspapers line of
cases, has adopted a structural theory of the Constitution which
assumes the Judicial Branch to be a governing agency subject
to the sovereign limitations of the self-governing electorate.
There is no question that the Justices in Richmond Newspapers appreciated this aspect of their decision. Justice Brennan,
in particular, appeared to realize that a right of public access
premised on a theory of self-government would not hold unless
the claim were directed at an actual political agency of government. If the Judiciary did not perform acts of "governance,"
principles of self-governance could not be implicated. After initially characterizing the "crucial" issue of access as one of determining the utility of access to a designated "government process," 5' Justice Brennan later returned with the following observations:
[T]he trial is more than a demonstrably just method of
adjudicating disputes and protecting rights. It plays a pivotal role in the entire judicial process, and, by extension, in
our form of government. Under our system, judges are not
mere umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate branch of government. While individual cases turn
upon the controversies between parties, or involve particular
prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical
consequences upon members of society at large. Moreover,
judges bear responsibility for the vitally important task of
construing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, so far
as the trial is the mechanism for judicial factfinding, as
well as the initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a
genuine governmental proceeding." 2
And although Justice Brennan certainly expressed the greatest appreciation of the issue, he was not alone in his willingness to characterize the Judiciary as a political branch of government as a prerequisite to finding a right of access in the

351. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980).

352. Id. at 595-96.
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self-governing public. Even Chief Justice Burger, who found the
right of access to be implied rather than structurally guaranteed, claimed a unique political significance for the trial process:
[The] expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters
relating to the functioning of government. Plainly it would
be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher
concern and importance to the people than the manner in
which criminal trials are conducted.353
Furthermore, Justice Stevens, in commenting on the apparent
anomaly of the Court recognizing a self-governing right of access with respect to the Judicial Branch while repeatedly denying it with respect to the Executive Branch, also explicitly
adopted a characterization of the Judiciary as a political arm of
government:
It is somewhat ironic that the Court should find more reason to recognize a right of access today than it did in
Houchins....
In any event... I agree that the First
Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgement of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including the Judicial
Branch."
The difficulty with the Court's analysis of the Judiciary as a
co-political branch of government, at least for the purpose of
analyzing the essential attributes of self-government, is that the
analysis appears to prove too much for the right of access.
Quite simply, if the right of access applies to the Judiciary because it is a co-equal political branch, it follows perforce that
the right of access must apply at least equally to the other two
branches. Clearly, however, this is not the case. The Supreme
Court, as we have seen, has been adamantly opposed to recognizing any affirmative constitutional right of access to information held by the other two branches. The Court has viewed this

353. Id. at 575.
354. Id. at 583-84.
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as a political question that is foreclosed to the courts by traditional principles of separation of powers. 5
Our proposed restatement of the doctrine continues, as it
must, to recognize the Judiciary as a distinctly 'governmental
agency, exercising sovereign power on behalf of the self-governing electorate. However, it does not view the Judiciary as necessarily co-equal for all purposes. Rather, it assumes that pertinent differences among the three branches, particularly those
characterizing the different representational capacities of each
branch, renders legitimate a different, yet nonetheless constitutionally derived, entitlement of public access. Therefore, a constitutional right of access limited to the Judiciary may be recognized on the basis of traditional principles of self-government
without breaching the walls of political separation.
The revised reading of the right of access therefore addresses
the "theoretically endless" quality of the doctrine in its present
form, and at the same time restructures its claim to constitutional legitimacy. It also restructures the doctrine itself. The
revised right of access is a right of access to the Judicial
Branch as a whole rather than to a particular proceeding or
process. This right recognizes more than a simple "interest" in
access that is subject to being balanced against competing governmental interests. It establishes instead a right of access
subject only to a set of compelling exceptions.
B. Adopting the Revised Right of Access
Assuming that the Supreme Court has adopted the view that
the Judiciary is a governing agency subject to the access imperatives of a self-governing public, there are three principal reasons for adopting the proposed restructuring of the right of
access. First, and certainly foremost, the underlying theory
compels the revision. Second, the revised right provides a more
definitive standard of access for the case law. Finally, the proposed revision facilitates the principled extension of the right to
the new and more controversial issues of access.

355. See infra text accompanying note 373.
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The Structural Theory Compels the Revision

The structural theory of the First Amendment adopted in
Richmond Newspapers is a political theory of the primary and
subtextual guarantees of the Constitution. It views the Constitution as not only a legal text, but also as a seminal act of selfgovernment. It asserts that the primary political or structural
purpose of the Constitution is the building of a self-governing
republic. All provisions of the Constitution are informed by, and
must conform to, this prior objective. The Constitution itself is
viewed as a formative act of self-governance that expresses and
preserves the sovereignty of the republicans. This power of selfgovernment, including the power to revoke or amend any provision of the Constitution, is realized through the democratic
institution of suffrage. Thus, an electorate that is duly informed
on the issues of government is a necessary precondition of selfgovernment, even in a duly constituted representative democracy. Public access to all information concerning the conduct of
government is therefore necessary to sustain the legitimacy of
the government itself.
The structural theory posits the value of the political process
of self-government as prior to, and higher than, the enumerated
guarantees of the Constitution. In Meiklejohn's terms, free
speech serves self-government and not the other way
around." 6 The structural theory is therefore a theory of political process, not of individual rights, which embodies an implied
critique of the limitations of traditional libertarian philosophy.
It advances an optimal condition of self-government that is
beyond both the optimal self-acquisition of economic theory and
the optimal self-expression of libertarian theory. It is a republican theory of government adapted to the American Constitution
which ultimately manifests the traditional tensions between
republican and libertarian philosophies. 57

356. "The freedom that the First Amendment protects is not, then, an absence of
regulation. It is the presence of self-government." Meiklejohn, supra note 267, at 252.
357. "Understood in some narrower sense, republicanism stood in opposition to other forms of democratic and constitutional theory, such as Lockean natural rights and
social contract theory." Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight from
Substance, 97 YAL L.J. 1633, 1635 (1988).
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A right of access limited to mere observation of, or attendance at, certain designated legal proceedings, where "access to
a particular government process is important in terms of that
very process,"35 s does not satisfy the principal goal of the
structural theory. The information essential to informed selfgovernment is not satisfied by mere "passive access" to those
relatively few and highly formalized proceedings which have
traditionally countenanced, if not assumed, a public audience.
The notion of peeling back the limited and formalized expressions of information provided by public officials, in order to
expose the "real" information that drives the political process, is
precisely what originally led to the wide-ranging development of
"open government" laws in the several decades prior to Richmond Newspapers. Today, a genuine right of access to government information implies not so much the simple increased flow
of information to an otherwise passive population, but rather
the recognition of an affirmative entitlement by an inquisitive,
self-sponsored public.
Stated differently, the structural theory of the Constitution
would command sovereign public access to the judicial system,
regardless of the particularized form of its institutions and
proceedings. Such access is justified because the right of access
is to the system itself and not to its particular and variable
features. Thus, if the process of adjudication by trial were abolished in America, the structural theory would still command
access to whatever governmental adjudication process took its
place. This is a telling point when considering the increasingly
limited and less consequential occurrence of trials within the
American legal system, both civil and criminal. 59 Quite simply, a fully informed understanding of how, and how well, the
Judiciary is performing can no longer be gleaned from the back
row of the courtroom. 6 '

358. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589.
359. In the New York City Criminal Court which handled 213,000 non-felony cases
in 1990, fewer than one-half of one percent [0.4%] of the cases went to trial. OFFICE
OF COURT ADMIN., EXEcUTIvE SUIMmARY, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
FOR THE JUDICIAL YEAR TO DATE 4 (Dec. 30, 1990) (Table 1).
360. Indeed, today it is even difficult to make it to the back row. For a charming
account of one person's day-long attempt to gain entry to a major trial, see Trial,
THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 1990, at 28-29.
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The traditional libertarian philosophy of the First Amendment provides a negative freedom from governmental interference with individual expression. This philosophy proved incapable of recognizing a positive freedom to compel government to
provide publicly held information.3"' The structural theory provided the missing basis for recognizing such an affirmative
liberty by positing a First Amendment value wholly independent of speech and expression: an informed electorate. The
primary concern of the structural theory is informed suffrage,
not informed speech. Therein lies both the novelty, and the rub,
of the new right of access. Our proposed revision to the right,
making all judicial acts presumptively subject to public scrutiny, more fully complies with the structural goal of the theory.
Additionally, this revised version of the right more directly
reflects the principal of popular sovereignty that underlies the
structural theory. More specifically, judges would be subject to
public review as public officials. Each exercise of judicial authority would be an act of governmental power, performed on
behalf of the self-governing public. To paraphrase the famous
dictum of Craig v. Harney, what transpires before the judge is
public business. 6' Thus, judicial conduct cannot be self-privileged by the courts. This was in fact, Justice Brennan's most
pointed critique of the majority's holding in Gannett Newspapers: "Gannett holds that judges, as officers of [the] government,
may in certain circumstances remove themselves from public
view and perhaps also holds that they can make this decision
without even considering the interests of the people."3 6'
The Judiciary must itself be accountable for its performance
to the sovereign public. Although judges have the power of
judicial review over the other branches, the ultimate review is
political and belongs to the sovereign public. As one state court
judge commented, "[T]he most direct expression of this right of
access may be stated this way-the court is a part of government and what goes on in court is the business of the peo-

361. See supra Part I.
362. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("What transpires in the courtroom
is public property.").
363. Brennan, supra note 110, at 177.
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ple."3 ' One Seventh Circuit judge expressed the point even
more emphatically:
What happens in the halls of government is presumptively
open to public scrutiny. Judges deliberate in private but
issue public decisions after public arguments based on public records. The political branches of government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view
makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat; this requires
rigorous justification.3"
This notion of access as a means of ensuring judicial accountability is directly expressed by Justice Brennan in Richmond
Newspapers. After describing how a trial is in fact a "genuine
governmental proceeding," 6 6 Justice Brennan asserts that "[i]t
follows that the conduct of the trial is pre-eminently a matter
of public interest. More importantly, public access to trials acts
as an important check, akin in purpose to the other checks and
balances that infuse our system of government." 6 7 It is indeed
possible to conclude, as has one noted commentator, that "the
democratic principle of accountability underlies the decision in
Richmond Newspapers."68
Another theoretical difficulty surrounding the Court's adoption of the structural theory of the First Amendment is that it
appears too wide-ranging for a right of access limited solely to
the Judicial Branch. If the sovereign public is entitled to access
to all information bearing upon decision-making by governmental officials, then how can the right not apply equally to the
other two branches? The structural theory of a self-governing
electorate would appear to apply with even greater force to the
elected representatives who govern in the public's stead. Indeed,
it was not until Richmond Newspapers that the right-to-know
implications of the structural theory of the First Amendment
had ever been applied to the Judicial Branch. In fact, the lead364. In re Marriage of Johnson, 598 N.E.2d 406, 410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (wrestling
with the issue of access).
365. In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1992) (resolving persistent claims to
secrecy within the appellate process).
366. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596 (1980).
367. Id. (citation omitted).
368. Lewis, supra note 111, at 2.
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ing proponent of a First Amendment-based right-to-know government information did not even include the Third Branch as
an object of the putative right.3 69 The apparent irony of employing a theory of representative self-government to establish a
right of access, limited to the least representative branch of
government, cannot be ignored."'
It is worthwhile to note that this problem of an
underinclusive right is not unique to our proposed revision to
the right and poses an equally vexing conundrum for the right
in its present formulation. In the initial expression of the right
of access enunciated in Richmond Newspapers, the overinclusive
quality of the underlying theory was resolved by reference to
the "history prong" of the two-part analysis. The right of access
was said to apply in particular to the criminal jury trial because that institution was historically open to the public. The
notion was that the structural design of the Constitution both
informed and was informed by historical practice. While Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Brennan employed the historical
factor differently, both ultimately used it to explain how their
rather broad revisions to First Amendment theory had a limited, if not unique, application to criminal trials. For Justice
Brennan in particular, the historical factor was a "helpful principle" 71 that explained how the "theoretically endless"3 72
quality of the structural theory could be reasonably limited.
Today, however, the so-called history prong of the test has
essentially been abandoned by the access doctrine. 7 ' The
right of access, as developed and expanded in recent case law,
relies almost exclusively on the "functional utility" prong of the
original test. Historical practice no longer operates to establish
or corroborate a putative entitlement to access to judicial infor-

369. See Emerson, supra note 255.
370. BeVier, supra note 6, at 313 ("When the result in a particular case portends
significant new doctrinal developments that will necessarily expand the Court's power
to review the actions of other governmental branches, both state and federal, it is
fair to demand that its proffered rationales sustain a particularly heavy burden of
justification.").
371. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589.
372. See Brennan, supra note 110, at 177, noted in Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 588.
373. See supra text accompanying note 181.
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mation. Thus, the dilemma of underinclusion has been compounded in the more recent case law.
The answer to this riddle may indeed be straightforward:
perhaps the First Amendment right of access does not apply to
the other branches of government simply because it cannot be
so applied. In other words, the limitation is practical, or political, but not theoretical. 'While the political theory of self-governing access does apply equally to all branches of government, the
separation of powers doctrine precludes the Judiciary from applying the right of access to any branch other than itself. In
other words, the very reason why the Court could not grant a
right of access to non-judicial information in cases such as
Houchins v. KQED, is the same reason why such a right of access could be granted in Richmond Newspapers.
It must be recalled that all of the access cases prior to
Gannett Newspapers involved claims to information held or
controlled by the Executive Branch. As we have seen, the Supreme Court, despite some encouraging dicta, consistently rejected all claims to such access. 74 And the Court did so ostensibly on the basis of the libertarian, shield-only paradigm of the
First Amendment. But other, perhaps more fundamental, reasons were also expressed by the individual Justices 'to excuse
the Court's failure to acknowledge an otherwise compelling
claim of access to government information. For example, the
members of the Court repeatedly expressed their concern that a
judicially-enforced right of access to executive information would
force the Court beyond the wall of political separation. Thus, in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 75 three of the Justices, expressing
three separate and distinct points of view as to the holding in
the case, shared a common aversion to the political consequences of the claim to access:
The respondent's argument is flawed, not only because it
lacks precedential support and is contrary to statements in
this Court's opinions, but also because it invites the Court

374. See supra Part I.
375. 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (the penultimate prison access case that was thought to
foreclose Supreme Court recognition of a constitutional right of access).
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to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task which
the Constitution left to the political processes.376
Forces and factors other than the Constitution must determine what government-held data are to be made available
to the public.377
Such matters involve questions of policy which generally
must be resolved by the political branches of government.?8
Justice Powell, in dissent to an earlier denial of access in
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,379 expressed a similar concern:
"Common sense and proper respect for the constitutional commitment of the affairs of state to the Legislative and Executive
branches should deter the Judiciary from chasing the right-ofaccess rainbows that an advocate's eye can spot in virtually all
governmental actions."380
This conspicuous concern with the "political question" aspects
of the putative right of access may help to explain the Court's
reversal of posture from Gannett Newspapers to Richmond
Newspapers. As discussed earlier, Gannett Newspapers was the
first Supreme Court case involving a claim of access to judicial
information. The Court routinely applied the precedents of the
earlier access cases and denied the claim of access to a pretrial
suppression hearing. But, as we have seen, 8 ' the result
proved immediately and profoundly unsatisfactory to the Justices themselves. The Court quickly granted certiorari in Richmond Newspapers and Gannett was effectively overruled within
a year of its release. Taken only at face value, it is exceedingly
difficult to reconcile the holding in Richmond Newspapers with
the Court's earlier access holdings.3 82 A better understanding
of this "watershed" development emerges from the simple fact
that the claim in Gannett, unlike the earlier cases, did not
afford the Court the cover of the separation of powers doctrine.

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id. at 12 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 16 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
417 U.S. 843 (1974).
Id. at 872.
See supra text accompanying note 106.
See BeVier supra note 6, at 320-22.
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It had proven far easier to excuse a denial of public access to
public information than it did to justify it.
Therefore, the answer to the dilemma of underinclusion in
the structural right of access is itself structural. This answer
acknowledges not only the unique constitutional responsibility
that the Judiciary bears with respect to the other two branches,
but also with respect to the electorate. To the extent the structural theory adopted in Richmond Newspapers assumes the
Judiciary is a governing agency, the theory posits a direct agency relationship as well as responsibility between the Judiciary
and the self-governing public. The public is entitled to access
because the governing Judiciary is accountable to it, although
not necessarily by way of direct electoral control. The principle
of accountability extends to juridic conduct as a whole and not
merely to particularized proceedings or occurrences.
At first glance, this notion of a Judiciary directly accountable
to the public is problematic. It assumes that the purveyors of
judicial review are themselves in some manner subject to popular review. This would contradict several of the basic premises
of the orthodox theories of judicial review. These theories characteristically posit the necessity of a Judiciary insulated from
the momentary majoritarian pressures exerted upon the other
two branches. The extraordinary power of judicial review is
typically deemed legitimate only to the extent that judicial decision-making is neutral to all commands save that of the constitutional text.38 The "counter-majoritarian difficulty"3 posited by judicial review is resolved by assuming that the Judiciary
is uniquely capable of a constitutional fidelity, or virtue, precisely because of its non-majoritarian posture. Yet the orthodox
premise of neutrality is not inconsistent with the structural
premise of accountability. The latter simply asserts that the
neutrality of judges is required in fact as well as theory, and
that the actual decision-making of judges is, in the end, not en-

383. Bork, supra note 217, at 4 ("If [the Court] does not have and rigorously adhere to a valid and consistent theory of majority and minority freedoms based upon
the Constitution, judicial supremacy, given the axioms of our system, is, precisely to
that extent, illegitimate."). The constitutional text, however, is itself a non-momentary,
transcendent expression of majority will.
384. This phrase is attributed to ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986).
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tirely privileged. Under the more modern view, judges are properly required to be both neutral and accountable.38 5
The command of the structural theory adopted in Richmond
Newspapers for a systemic, as opposed to a particularized, right
of access, finds a good deal of collateral support in the burgeoning literature of the "republican revival" theorists. 386 These
"new republican" theories are essentially structuralist reinterpretations of the Constitution. They find in the very structure
of the Constitution a classical republican commitment to disinterested, non-pluralist civic deliberation. This process-based
commitment to realizing the true general will of the public
requires a government that affirmatively sponsors and secures
an informed electorate.
Republicanism is of course most commonly associated with
this reliance upon the possibility of a genuine "civic virtue."
This virtue is not, however, a freedom. It is an affirmative obligation of the citizen which expresses the very purpose of government in a self-governing polity. In turn, the government is
affirmatively obligated to promote and facilitate the maintenance of this civic virtue. Although individual rights are not
inconsistent with republican theory,38 7 interest-based factions

385. This is not to deny the genuine tension between this structural theory of
"Judiciary review" and the more traditional theory of judicial review. The latter typically assumes that judicial review is a counter-mEjoritarian power that is consistent
with political democracy only to the extent that the Judiciary is itself politically neutral and confines itself to the application of the majoritarian will expressed in the
very text of the Constitution. In that sense, the Judiciary is presumed to derive its
legitimacy from the fact that it is insulated from the momentary expressions of popular will, and therefore from popular review, by the fixed and superior will of the text.
The structural theory assumes, somewhat to the contrary, that the Judiciary is itself
a proactive political agency which is legitimate only to the extent that it is subject to
public review. Once again, Justice Brennan provides the critical observation:
The interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory law,
while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is subject to
special constraints and informed by unique considerations. Guided and
confined by the Constitution and pertinent statutes, judges are obliged to
be discerning, to exercise judgment, and to prescribe rules.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 595, n.20 (citations omitted).
386. See, e.g., Symposium, Classical Philosophy and the American Constitutional
Order, 66 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 3 (1990); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition,
97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
387. "Republican theories are not, however, hostile to the protection of individual
or group autonomy from state control. Indeed, legal rights have quite consistently
accompanied republican systems." Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
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are certainly anathema to the realization of civic virtue."M
Rights are a necessary, but insufficient, condition for the republican theorist. Obligations to the collective self are the critical
and distinguishing feature of a republican system.
In the new republican theories, civic virtue is manifested in
the democratic institution of political discourse,3 89 or what is
referred to as "deliberative democracy."39 The transformation
of self-interest into collective interest typically implies a
dialogical imperative of sorts. The government is therefore principally burdened with the affirmative obligation to facilitate an
informed public discourse. And almost invariably, the new republican theorists commend an exalted role for the Judiciary as
either guardian 9 ' or actual practitioner 9 2 of such virtuous
discourse.9 3 These juriscentric theories are still in the formative, experimental stages of constructing a communitarian antidote to the interest-based theories of pluralist constitutional
jurisprudence-they have as yet had little bearing on any actu-

97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1551 (1988).
388. "Intellectually, [republicanism] promises escape from the dead end in which
pluralist constitutional theory finds itself. Politically, it moves toward fulfilling the
deepest human impulses that underlie liberalism." Paul Brest, Comment, Further
Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623

(1988).
389. "The republican and the interpretive approaches share an understanding of
community as the locus of discourse. Speaking, not governing, is the main activity of
the theorists' constitutional community." PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY 1
(1992).
390. In the legal literature the term is most commonly associated with the writings of Cass Sunstein. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 386. But the term, as is true of
much in the republican revival, has its origins in the political science literature. See,
e.g., Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican
Government, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION?. 102 (Robert A. Goldwin &
William A. Schambra eds., 1980) (cited in Sunstein, supra note 386, at 1562, n.127).
391. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 386.
392. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
393. The heavy reliance of the new republicans on the Judiciary as the saving
grace of their various systems has drawn a good deal of critical comment. See, e.g.,
Brest, supra note 387, at 1625 ("[It is at least ironic that much of the legal scholarship of the republican revival, rather than working to promote participation and discourse in those [non-judicial] forums, is as court-centered as the pluralist scholarship
from which it distinguishes itself.").
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al doctrinal developments. 94 However, they have had an enormous impact within the realm of constitutional discourse.3 95
The critical accomplishment of the republican revival has
been its successful reemphasis of the essential role of public
discourse in legitimizing the outcomes of the political process. It
has also, although somewhat less successfully, refocused attention on the role of the Judiciary in guaranteeing the essential
due process of this deliberative self-government. The new
republicans have not as yet focused on the more concrete issues
of what exactly would constitute legitimate discourse in a
neorepublican era. Yet it is indeed striking how resonant the
Richmond Newspapers right of access is with the major themes
of the republican revival. These themes include the affirmative
obligation of government, independent of any right of individual
expression, to promote an informed, self-governing electorate on
matters of governmental affairs. In retrospect, Alexander
Meiklejohn appears as a republican revivalist before the
396
revival.
Another compelling collateral development that serves to
underscore the essential soundness of reconstructing the Richmond Newspapers doctrine as a systemic right of access is the
independent legislative development of a systemic right of access to the Administrative Branch. The popular clamoring for a
positive right-to-know government information began in the
early 1940s.3 97 The essential modern insight of the right-toknow advocates was that in an Age of Information, where information is power, there appeared to be an inherent tendency on

394. "The republican revival is designed, above all, as a response to understandings that treat governmental outcomes as a kind of interest-group deal, and that
downplay the deliberative functions of politics and the social formation of preferences." Sunstein, supra note 386, at 1590.
395. "[C]urrently one of the most significant movements in constitutional jurisprudence. . .

."

Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS. L.

REV. 679, 680 (1992).
396. "Meiklejohn's interpretation is radical and appeals to contemporary proponents
of a constitutional 'right-to-know' precisely because it denies that the First Amendment guarantees a right of citizens, recognizing instead a public power." O'Brien,
supra note 99, at 617.
397. The phrase "right-to-know" has been attributed to a speech given by Kent
Cooper in 1945. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT-TO-KNOW: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (1981). Cooper later published The Right-toKnow in 1956.
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the part of those already enjoying power to self-privilege their
bases of information. Nowhere was this more apparent than in
the post-New Deal executive agencies that appeared to be gaining monopoly control over vast areas of the public enterprise.
These agencies quickly became the focus of the drive to maintain openness in government and were the object of the principal legislation enacted with respect to rights of access. Despite
the obvious and significant differences between the right of
access to government agency information and access to judicial
information, the parallels are striking. These two distinct bodies
of law bear a common theory and structure, and a similar set
of doctrinal issues. 98
Earlier, this paper described how the right recognized in
Richmond Newspapers was a concerned reaction to the emergence of adjudicative practices which attempted to foreclose
certain proceedings from public scrutiny. The Supreme Court
found such practices repugnant to the unenumerated, structural
guarantee of a self-governing public. This mirrored the earlier
pattern of the legislative development of "open government"
laws. The legislative initiatives were closely bound to the revival of the Madisonian principle of self-informed self-government:
"A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both."3 99 There are today a great number of
statutes-federal, state and local-which provide for public
access to government information and proceedings.4"0 However, the two federal laws which dominate the field are the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 4. and the Government in the
Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act).40 ' The remarkable parallels between these two laws and the Richmond Newspapers doctrine
are striking.
398. Professor Emerson, after outlining the struggling case law development of a
putative "right-to-know," noted: "Fortunately, a good start has already been made to
achieve the same end through legislation. The Federal Freedom of Information Act
adopts much of the basic pattern just outlined." Emerson, supra note 255, at 17.
399. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard A. Hunt ed., 1910) (discussing Kentucky's
adoption of a general education system).
400. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press maintains an updated
state-by-state guide to the open government laws, called "Tapping Officials' Secrets".
401. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
402. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988).
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The FOIA was the first to pass. When it was signed into law
on July 4, 1966, it was celebrated as a major check on institutionalized secrecy. The legislative history of the Act, which was
extensive, consistently characterized the issue as one involving
an insidious secrecy that threatened the very purpose and legitimacy of government. 3 A Senate report accompanying the bill
framed the issue in classic, Madisonian terms:
Today the very vastness of our Government and its myriad
of agencies makes it difficult for the electorate to obtain
that "popular information" of which Madison spoke. But it
is only when one further considers the hundreds of departments, branches, and agencies which are not directly responsible to the people, that one begins to understand the
great importance of having an information policy of full
disclosure .... Although the theory of an informed electorate is vital to the proper operation of a democracy, there is
nowhere in our present law a statute which affirmatively
provides for that information.4
This policy commitment to an informed self-governing public
was explicitly affirmed ten years later in the Sunshine Act. The
opening words of the Act recognized the now settled force of the
principles of self-government that were driving the proliferation
of open government laws throughout the 1960s and 1970s: "It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that the
public is entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding
the decisionmaking processes of the Federal Government." °5
The structure of these two federal laws is also quite telling.
Each of them creates a broad presumptive right of access to all
information within the public system of its coverage. The initial
burden is not on the citizen to justify a claim of access; instead,
the government bears the burden of justifying closure. Both
laws then provide a categorical list of exemptions based upon a
strict balancing of the need for openness with the varied legitimate needs for non-disclosure. The subject matter of their re-

403. See FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS,
CASES, ARTICLES, S. Doc. No. 82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (primary source for legislative history of the FOIA).
404. CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION AND

FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
405. Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
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spective coverages is also quite suggestive. The FOIA provides
access to agency records and the Sunshine Act accords access to
agency meetings. Together they cover the same ground the
Richmond Newspapers doctrine now covers with regard to judicial information.4 6 In Richmond Newspapers terms, the
FOIA is to judicial documents what the Sunshine Act is to
judicial proceedings. Also, the doctrinal consequences of the two
subject areas similarly replicate the experience of the Richmond
Newspapers doctrine. The law governing access to papers is far
more problematic than the law governing access to places.4 '
The doctrinal issues that have developed and to some extent
been resolved under the open government laws also appear to
anticipate issues emerging within the Richmond Newspapers
doctrine. Judges appear to have been no less creative than
agency heads in developing avoidance mechanisms to circumvent open access. For example, following passage of the Sunshine Act, the decision-maldng processes of many agencies were
apparently recast in an effort to avoid holding a "meeting" to
which public access was required.4 8 This of course is not unlike the practices of judges who remove various functions from
the courtroom to a bench40 9 or in camera410 conference in
406. One enthusiastic partisan of the press, in immediate reaction to the holding
in Richmond Newspapers, predicted that in time "the First Amendment will be looked
at as a Freedom of Information Act." James C. Goodale, Gannett is Burned by
Richmond's FirstAmendment 'Sunshine Act," NATL L.J., Sept. 29, 1980, at 24.
407. See Stephen A. Klitzman, Government in the Sunshine Act-Nuts, Bolts and
Tacks: A Summary of Statutory Provisions, Judicial Interpretations and Pending Issues, 38 FED. BAR. NEWS & J. 114 (1979) (noting the fewer number of reported cases
under the Sunshine Act as opposed to the FOIA and the generally fewer-than-anticipated problems with the former).
408. The primary study of the effects of the Sunshine Act on agency meeting practices concluded that: "There are reasons to believe that there has been a shift in
patterns of decision-making behavior, at least in a number of agencies, away from
collegial processes toward segmented, individualized processes ... " and "in many
settings, the evidence indicates, there is an absence of meaningful meetings on fundamental questions of policy and strategy if those meetings must be in public." David
M. Welborn et al., Implementation and Effects of the Federal Government in the Sunshine Act: FinalReport for the Administrative Conference of the United States, reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 199, 236, 248 (1984).
409. Cf. United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing the
courts' authority to conduct closed bench conferences to protect information in a criminal investigation).
410. Cf. Cable News Network (CNN) v. United States, 824 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (permitting an in camera voir dire in a criminal investigation to protect certain
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order to avoid the public right of access to the "trial" proceeding.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Richmond Newspapers
right of access is better construed as a systemic rather than a
particularized, ad hoc right of access. The underlying structural
theory virtually compels such an interpretation, and the right
so revised would gain the collateral benefit of parallel developments in the areas of modern republican theory and open
government legislation.
2. The Revision Provides a More Definitive Standard for the
Case Law
The proposed restatement of the Richmond Newspapers right
of access-to render it an across-the-board right of access to
judicial decisionmaking-is not only more consistent with the
underlying First Amendment theory. It also provides a more
definitive, bright-line standard to inform the case law. Indeed,
the revised reading of the right of access is in accord with the
major holdings of the established case law. It requires no significant unsettling of the existing doctrine and provides a much
more sensible and readily applicable standard for trial courts.
Earlier, this paper described how the rapidly expanding case
law has stretched the Richmond Newspapers doctrine perilously
thin.41 ' In order to expand the doctrine beyond the "trial," the
courts were forced to stretch the doctrine to cover various trialrelated "proceedings." To then expand the doctrine to include
the numerous papers and documents in a case, the courts had
to adopt an expansive reading of "proceeding."412 In addition,
the lower courts have often simply resorted to an alternative
body of access law where the stretch of the doctrine has proven
too tenuous. The result has been twofold. On the one hand, the
Richmond Newspapers doctrine, as developed by the lower
courts, is now miles beyond the analytical harbor of the Su-

privacy interests).
411. See supra text accompanying note 180.
412. See, e.g., In re Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[E]ven though a
search warrant is not part of the criminal trial itself, like voir dire, a search warrant
is certainly an integral part of a criminal prosecution.").
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preme Court cases. On the other hand, the law of access has
become a crazyquilt of cdnstitutional, common, statutory, and
local laws without a clear or dominant thread.
The central fault with the Richmond Newspapers doctrine at
present is that the essential "functional utility" test fails to
explain or inform the case law. As one scholarly commentator
has noted:
Although offered as part of [Justice Brennan's] effort to
restrain the "theoretically endless" stretch of the right-togather information, the inquiry into whether access to a
particular governmental process is important in terms of
the process fails to focus First Amendment analysis....
Moreover, at least as elaborated by Justice Brennan, the
principle that would limit access to cases where it is
deemed important in terms of the process to which it is
sought does not provide meaningful guidance concerning the
most significant and controlling question of how to discern
whether access is important ..

The lower courts have thus far managed well enough without a
more definitive standard. This is not uncommon for a new doctrine in the formative stages of growth. However, the need to
reduce and rationalize the new law will assume increasing
importance and the cases themselves will become more difficult.
Therefore, the measure of decision must become easier.
The revised standard reduces itself to a single question: Is
the information in question relevant to the court's official exercise of judicial authority? If so, the presumption of a right of
access applies. The presumption applies to all information that
comes within the purview of the court, regardless of whether it
occurs in the form of a proceeding, document or any other medium. The information presented to the public official is public
information. The form the information takes is irrelevant. However, some information may be privileged from public access if
the party seeking closure demonstrates the "compelling"" 4 or
"overriding""5 interest required to overcome, or out-balance,
the First Amendment interest in access.
413. BeVier, supra note 6, at 337.
414. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
415. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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The revised right is also consistent with the doctrine of Seat416 which held that documents
tle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
exchanged between the parties as a matter of discovery, but not
submitted to the court, are not public information. There is, in
other words, a distinction between the litigation process and
the adjudicative process. This distinction is particularly significant on the civil side of litigation. Information obtained as a
matter of investigation or exchanged as a matter of discovery
does not fall within the right of access. It is only when that
information is brought to the attention of the court in relation
to an exercise of judicial authority that the information becomes
public and thereby subject to public access.417
The revised right of access does not require any reconciliation
with the cases prior to Richmond Newspapers. Those cases,
with the exception of Gannett Newspapers, did not involve judicial information and therefore fall outside the revised right.418
However, the common law right of access addressed in Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc.419 would be affected by the revised right. To the extent that judicial records fall within the
scope of the revised constitutional right of access, as undoubtedly most of them would, the Nixon standard of access would be
superseded.
The test under the revised right of access to judicial information bears a direct parallel to the standard of access under the
Sunshine Act. The policy of open government in the Sunshine
Act is premised on the same theory of self-government that
underlies the right of access in Richmond Newspapers. The
purpose of the Act is to bring the "whole decision-making process"42 of the Administrative Branch into public view. The debate under the Act over the extent to which the agency process
must be open to the public has centered around an attempt to
distinguish between various agency functions. Functions that
416. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
417. See In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Secrecy persists only if
the court does not use the information to reach a decision on the merits.").
418. The revised reading of the right would, however, affect the issue of whether
the First Amendment right of access applies to executions. See supra note 149. If an
execution was deemed to be a non-judicial proceeding, then the right would not apply.
419. 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (holding that judicial records and exhibits are subject to
a lesser standard of access).
420. S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975).

1995]

"DANCING IN THE COURTHOUSE"

represent the "inquiry" stage of agency action are distinguished
from those functions that involve "deliberative" action.42 1 This
distinction appears tailor-made for the Judicial Branch as well.
According to the traditional division of labor within our adversarial system of adjudication, the lawyers representing the
parties conduct what is essentially the non-deliberative inquiry
stage and the judge has primary responsibility for the actual
adjudication. Therefore, all information obtained or exchanged
by the lawyers, by whatever process, does not at that point fall
within the deliberative/adjudicative process. On the other hand,
almost all information related to an official matter before the
court, which comes to the attention of the judge, presumably
bears on the deliberative process of the court and is thereby
subject to the public right of access. Therefore, regardless of the
informational process in question (discovery, deposition, pleabargaining, settlement, warrant, etc.), when the judge becomes
engaged in a deliberative capacity, the information brought to
the attention
of the court must likewise be accessible to the
422
public.
The revised focus of the right also clarifies the access to
which the public is entitled. Specifically, the public is entitled
to information bearing upon the operation of the judicial system. The right cannot adequately be understood or applied as a
right to particular proceedings or documents. Actual physical
access to a proceeding or document may be essential or meaningless. For instance, if the information sought concerns the
manner in which the trial court handles the courtroom confrontation and cross-examination of the minor victim of sexual
abuse, a verbatim transcript of the proceeding will likely deny
access to critical information within the contemplation of the
right. However, where a transcript does provide the information
421. See David A. Barrett, Note, Facilitating Government Decision Making: Distinguishing Between Meetings and Nonmeetings Under the Federal Sunshine Act, 66 TEX.
L. REv. 1195 (1988).
422. However, this analysis does not preclude an exception for deliberative information created by the judge. This would be in the nature of a "judicial work-produc"
exception to disclosure. One state court, dealing with a claim of access to a judge's
trial notes, pursuant to a state public records law, recognized such an exception. See
State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft, 619 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio 1993) (following the pattern established in the FOIA case law dealing with claims to public employees' personal
notes); see, e.g., Sibille v. Federal Reserve Bank, 770 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
British Airports Auth. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 531 F. Supp. 408 (D.D.C. 1982).
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necessary to a critical appraisal of the proceeding, immediate
physical access to the proceeding may be unnecessary.
Likewise, actual physical presence in the courtroom may be
inadequate if much of the critical deliberation takes place at
bench or in camera conferences. Similarly, physical presence at
a trial often does not provide meaningful access to the critical
evidence in the case, even though it is admitted in open court.
Fgr instance, it is not uncommon in contemporary criminal
trials for the most critical evidence in the case to be in the
form of audiotapes played to the jurors through individual
headsets. Some courts, following Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., have held that the First Amendment applies only to
access to the proceeding itself. As such, access to the tape exhibits is outside the scope of the First Amendment right. Accordingly, access to the tapes may be readily denied for less
than compelling reasons."' This approach tends to exalt form
over substance and may substantially defeat the purpose of the
right. The focus of the right must always be on the information,
not the package, to which the public is entitled. 4
3. The Revision Facilitates a Principled Expansion of the Right
The development of the Richmond Newspapers right of access
was not driven by the unfolding logic of traditional First
Amendment doctrine. Indeed, as this article has earlier attempted to demonstrate, the new right of access emerged in
response to external pressure for greater openness than that
provided under traditional First Amendment principles. This
outside pressure to eliminate the numerous pockets of secrecy
that remain within the judicial system is likely to continue.4"
The second generation of issues, beyond the simple attachment
of various proceedings and documents, will involve far more
challenging and difficult matters. To be sure, there is already

423. See supra text accompanying note 188.
424. See, e.g., Matthew Bunker et al., Access to Government-Held Information in
the Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 543 (1993).
425. "In recent years, of course, the political pressures toward openness which
citizens have put upon their representatives have proved increasingly irresistible."
BeVier, supra note 20, at 509.
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evidence that the courts are reluctant to face some of these
issues. The proposed revision to the right of access will greatly
enhance the ability of the courts to address and resolve these
issues of increasing public concern.
It is certainly beyond the scope of this article to address in
any detail these various issues-in-waiting. However, it is worthwhile to identify some of them, if only to underscore the centripetal force of the new doctrine of access. The revised right of
access has potential application to the following: judicially
sealed settlement agreements;4 26 judicial protective orders to
seal discovery materials;4 21 the exclusion of cameras from the
courtroom; 4 28 confidential filings and proceedings

of judicial

boards;4 29

review
confidential filings and proceedings of attorney disciplinary panels;4.. anonymous juries;4"' and anony426. See John J. Watkins, Expanding the Public's Right-to-Know: Access to Settlement Records Under the First Amendment, Discussion Paper D-7, December, 1990,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, at 6-9; Laleh Ispahani, The Soul
of Discretion: The Use and Abuse of Confidential Settlements, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs
111 (1992); Anne Bechamps, Note, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the
Public Have a Right-to-Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117 (1990); Elsa Walsh &
Benjamin Weiser, Public Courts, Private Justice, WASH. POST, Oct. 23-26, 1988; Benjamin Weiser, Forging a Covenant of Silence, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1989, at Al.
427. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991); Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in
Products Liability Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REv. 771 (1990);
Note, Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1813 (1984); Brian T. Fitzgerald, Sealed v. Sealed: A Public Court System Going Secretly Private, 6 J.L. & POL. 381 (1990).
428. Richard H. Frank, Cameras in the Courtroom: A First Amendment Right of
Access, 9 COMM. ENT. L.J. 749 (1987).
429. See Note, A FirstAmendment Right of Access to Judicial DisciplinaryProceedings, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1984); Brian R. Pitney, Note, Unlocking the Chamber
Doors: Limiting Confidentiality in Proceedings Before the Virginia Judicial Inquiry
and Review Commission, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 367 (1992).
430. An ABA study commission recommended an end to such secrecy and reported:
The Commission is convinced that secrecy in discipline proceedings continues to be the greatest single source of public distrust of lawyer disciplinary systems. Because it engenders such distrust, secrecy does great
harm to the reputation of the profession. The public's expectation of government and especially of judicial proceedings is that they will be open
to the public, on the public record, and that the public and media will be
able to freely comment on the proceedings. The public does not accept
the profession's claims that lawyers' reputations are so fragile that they
must be shielded from false complaints by special secret proceedings. The
irony that lawyers are protected by secret proceedings while earning their
livelihoods in an open system of justice is not lost on the public. On the
contrary it is a source of great antipathy toward the profession.
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mous victims. 4 32 Whenever issues of significant underlying
public concern begin to surface in the American courtroom, the
demand for greater public awareness quickly follows.
DeTocqueville, no doubt, would not have been surprised.
V. CONCLUSION
The argument in favor of recognizing a constitutional right of
access to judicial information has one compelling advantage:
there is no compelling argument against it. The Supreme Court
realized this immediately following its notoriously unpopular
holding in Gannett Newspapers. Within a year, the Court had
radically reversed its position, and in Richmond Newspapers
held that the First Amendment indeed affirmatively compels
the Judiciary to maintain an open courthouse. The key to this
doctrinal transformation was the rediscovery of a republican
principle of actively informed self-government. Affirmative access, rather than a mere absence of prior restraint, became the
bellwether of the real state of freedom of our self-governing
discourse.
Since Richmond Newspapers, the lower courts have found
little resistance to the rapid extension of the new right of access to cover most proceedings and documents within the
courthouse. But the demand for access is increasingly, and
compellingly, being heard beyond the narrow confines of pro-

The ABA, at its mid-year meeting in February, 1992, rejected the Commission's initial recommendation for a sunshine provision.
431. See Marc 0. Litt, "Citizen-Soldiers" or Anonymous Justice: Reconciling the
Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the Media and
the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 371 (1992); Robert L.
Raskopf, A First Amendment Right of Access to Juror's Identity: Towards a Fuller
Understanding of the Jury's Deliberative Process, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 357 (1990).
432. See Deborah W. Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims' Names, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 1113 (1993); Carey Haughwout, ProhibitingRape Victim Identification in the Media: Is it Constitutional?, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 735 (1992); Sarah H.
Hutt, Note, In Praise of Public Access: Why the Government Should Disclose the Identities of Alleged Crime Victims, 41 DUKE L.J. 368 (1991).
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ceedings and documents. The doctrine of access must be redressed not only to rationalize the existing case law but also to
meet the challenge of these increasing claims for a more open
government.

